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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 














Case No. CV-08-7258 
DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The parties entered into a long-term lease beginning July 31, 1996 for the purpose of 
operating The Brownstone Restaurant. This is a 30 year lease with two additional 10-year options. 
This lease and accompanying addenda A, B, C and D outline the terms of the lease and the parties' 
respective responsibilities. Plaintiff filed the complaint in this matter in November 2008 claiming 
various breaches of the lease including failure to timely pay the rent; failure to pay rent based on a 
formula using The Brownstone Restaurant's sales proceeds; failure to pay for the use of an upstairs 
space located above The Brownstone Restaurant; failure to pay for the use of space titled "Space 16"; 
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failure to pay for the use of an outdoor dining area; failure to pay for storage of a cooler stored at a 
place plaintiff commonly referred to as "the pipe yard." In general, defendant denied these 
allegations. 
As part of this lease, the parties are to equally share the utilities. Historically, the parties have 
waited to pay the rent until after the City ofldaho Falls prepared and produced a utility statement for 
The Brownstone Restaurant. Upon receipt of the utility statement, defendants would pay the entire 
utility obligation for the restaurant and deduct plaintiffs portion from the rent due. This was done 
for the ease of both parties so that only one check was written from defendants to plaintiff instead 
of defendants writing a check to plaintiff for the full amount of the rent and plaintiff paying 
defendants back its portion of the utilities. Often, plaintiff would pick up the City of Idaho Falls 
utility statement, calculate its portion of the utilities, deduct this amount from the base rent and 
present the statement to defendants for payment of rent (less plaintiffs portion of the utility). 
Prior to the time the defendants began to operate The Brownstone Restaurant, significant 
remodeling and renovation was necessary for the space subject to the lease. It was agreed that a 
portion of these costs would be born by plaintiff. It was further agreed to allow plaintiff to amortize 
the total amount owed over the course of ten ( 10) years interest free. Plaintiff would repay 
defendants at the rate of $372.00 per month. For the ease and convenience of the parties, instead of 
plaintiff writing a check or paying defendants this amount on a monthly basis, the $3 72.00 was 
deducted from the rental payment. The parties followed this pattern of payment since approximately 
the beginning of this lease. 
There were times when defendants made payments to plaintiff in excess of the base rent 
required under the lease. There were other times that plaintiff, when calculating the amount owed, 
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would reduce the base rent by its portion of the utilities, but would not give defendants the full 
$372.00 credit under their amortization agreement. If it is determined that defendants owe any 
additional amounts to plaintiff, those amounts should be offset by the additional amounts paid by 
defendants. 
In June 2008, plaintiff through its attorneys served on defendants a list of claimed breaches 
of the lease agreement and a demand for payment of claimed damages. The list of claimed damages 
is almost identical to the claims contained in plaintiff's complaint. In July 2008 and again in 
September 2008, plaintiff served on defendants "Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit the 
Premises". Said notices claimed that defendants were in breach of the lease, listed an amount that 
would cure the breach and that if the stated amounts were paid, defendants would be in compliance 
with the lease. In light of the June 2008 demand letter, at the time these three-day notices were 
received, defendants believed that plaintiff was offering a compromise of the amounts sought. 
Defendants acted on plaintiff's offer and paid the amount requested believing that they were in 
compliance and could continue occupying the leased space. 
During plaintiff's deposition, he was unable to state what the amounts listed in the three-day 
notices were specifically for. Plaintiff did state that those amounts could not be for anything other 
than base rent because under Idaho Code §6-301 et. seq, he could not seek anything other than base 
rent. However, in December 2008, plaintiff served on defendants another "Three Day Notice to Pay 
Rent or Quit the Premises". Accompanying this three-day notice plaintiff provided a list outlining 
the items for which plaintiff was seeking payment. That list included amounts for unpaid property 
taxes, additional rent based on the restaurant sales proceeds and gift certificates. 
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Plaintiff seeks additional rent for use of an upstairs space for dry storage. At the time 
defendants were using this space, the parties agreed this space could be used for an additional 
$100.00 per month. Defendants paid this $100.00 per month until the Court ordered defendants to 
vacate this space. Plaintiff accepted this $100.00 per month without complaint or request for 
additional amounts until shortly prior to this lawsuit. Plaintiff claims no agreement was reached for 
the use of this upstairs space and the rent sought for use of this space is $750.00 a month. 
Plaintiff seeks additional rent for use of an area called "Space 16." Space 16 is outlined on 
a drawing of the property which is Addendum C in the lease. However, as drawn on Addendum C, 
Space# 16 does not actually exist. The area in dispute is actually a narrow hallway leading from the 
outside directly to The Brownstone Restaurant. This area was used with plaintiffs permission until 
said permission was revoked in 2009. Until 2007, plaintiff also used this area to store some of its 
equipment. Plaintiff seeks an additional $100.00 per month for the use of this space. It is 
defendants' contention that this space was used with permission and was included in the amount 
already being paid for rent. 
Plaintiff seeks additional rent for use of outdoor space by defendants. Since approximately 
2002, defendants have used a portion of the sidewalk area in front of The Brownstone Restaurant 
for additional seating. Addendum B in the lease allows defendants the use of an outdoor space. This 
addendum does not contemplate additional rent being paid. Plaintiffs contention is that this 
language only allows a second story wooden deck structure, and any other outdoor use is not allowed 
under the lease. Defendant contends that the parties discussed several options, including the use of 
the sidewalk in front of the Restaurant. Plaintiff allowed the use of this space without objection or 
request for additional payment until just prior to this lawsuit. 
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Plaintiff seeks additional amounts for defendants storing a cooler in an outdoor space 
commonly referred to by plaintiff as "the pipe yard." This pipe yard is a fence enclosed area near 
Eagle Rock Station. Defendants had purchased an unassembled walk-in cooler and stored it at the 
pipeyard until the Court ordered its removal. Defendant contends that the parties discussed with 
storing the cooler at the pipe yard and that plaintiff agreed defendant could store it at this location 
without payment. Plaintiff denies that any agreement was reached to allow the storage of this cooler 
without compensation. Plaintiff seeks $100.00 a month for the use of this space. 
Plaintiff seeks payment for roofrepairs from defendants. Starting in approximately 2005, 
there were roof repairs to the entire building occupied not only by the Brownstone, but by other 
tenants as well. Briggs Roofing performed the repairs. Defendants paid approximately $7,100.00 
toward these roof repairs. Plaintiff seeks an additional $5,000.00 for these repairs. The language 
of the lease is unclear as to whether these costs should be born entirely by defendant, or shared with 
plaintiff. Defendant contends the agreement of the parties was for both plaintiff and defendant to 
share the costs. Plaintiff contends the defendant is responsible for all roof repair costs. Plaintiff 
testified during his deposition that he compromised and settled the roofrepairs with Briggs Roofing 
for approximately $5,500.00, an amount that has already been paid by defendant. 
Prior to the trial, the Court ruled on summary judgment that defendant's rent is the greater 
of the base rent listed or an amount based on the Brownstone Restaurant's sale proceeds. The Court 
further ruled that the amount sought may be reduced if the trier of fact finds the parties entered into 
an accord and satisfaction because of the three-day notices. 
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APPLICABLE LAW 
1. This is a contract action involving a lease. "The interpretation of a contract begins 
with the language of the contract itself. Crist on Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 
308, 160 P.3d 743, 747 (2007). If the language of the contract is unambiguous, then its meaning and 
legal effect must be determined from its words. Id. A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably 
subject to conflicting interpretations. Id. Determining whether a contract is ambiguous is a question 
of law over which the Court exercises free review. Id. Where a contract is ambiguous and the 
parties mutual intent cannot be understood from the language, intent is a question for the trier of fact. 
Farnsworth v. Dairymen's Creame,y Ass'n, 125 Idaho 866, 870, 876 P.2d 148, 152 (Ct. App. 
1994)." 
Bauchman-Kingston Partnership, LP, v. Haroldsen, 2008 Ida. Lexis 220, 5. 
2. There are clauses of the lease that are ambiguous and need to be interpreted by the 
trier of fact. These include each party's responsibility for roof repairs and the use of the outdoor 
space by defendants. There are other issues that the parties reached an oral agreement on, including 
the use of the upstairs space and space# 16 for storage and the use of the pipeyard to store a cooler. 
These agreements will be enforced if they are "complete, definite and certain in all its material terms, 
or contains provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty." Giacobbi 
Square v. PEK Corp., 105 Idaho 346,348,670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983). 
3. Plaintiff is claiming additional amounts owed for the use of the upstairs space, space 
#16, and the outdoor space. If the Court finds that there was no agreement for the use of this space, 
plaintiff must still prove its damages. Damages need be proved only with a reasonable certainty. 
This means that plaintiff must present proof of its claimed damages taking it out of the realm of 
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speculation. Anderson & Nafziger v. G. T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 182-83 (1979) (citing Big 
Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Grasmick, 91 Idaho 6,(1966)). 
3. Defendant has made a defense that the parties reached an accord and satisfaction 
through the three-day notices. Idaho Code §28-3-310 addresses what is necessary for an accord and 
satisfaction. This statute states: 
( 1) If a person against whom a claim is asserted proves that (I) that person in 
good faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full satisfaction of the claim, (ii) 
the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute, and (iii) 
the claimant obtained payment of the instrument, the following subsections apply. 
(2) Unless subsection (3) of this section applies, the claim is discharged if the 
person against whom the claim is asserted proves that the instrument or an 
accompanying written communication contained a conspicuous statement to the 
effect that the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the claim. 
Idaho Code §28-3-310. 
"To establish an accord and satisfaction the parties accepting a new or different obligation must do 
so knowingly and intentionally". Harris v. Wildcat Corp.,97 Idaho 884,886,556 P .2d 67, 69 (1976). 
However, "an accord and satisfaction may be implied from the attendant circumstances". Id. 
The elements of an accord and satisfaction are the following: 
1. A bona fide dispute as to the amount owed; 
2. That the debtor tendered an amount to the creditor with the intent that it be 
in total satisfaction of the amount owed; and 
3. The creditor accepted payment in full satisfaction of the amount owed. 
Beard v. George, 135 Idaho 635, 689, 23 P.3d 147 (2001). 
In this action, plaintiff presented defendants with three separate three-day notices, none of 
which contained any language limiting or clarifying the basis for the amounts sought. In the third 
notice the plaintiff attached a breakdown of the amounts sought showing clearly that plaintiff was 
using these three-day notices seeking payment for more than just rent. Said notices further stated 
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that if the amounts were paid the defendants would be in compliance with the lease. Defendant was 
under the reasonable belief that the amounts sought in those notices were for all issues plaintiff 
raised in a previous demand letter. Plaintiff claimed the amounts could only be for base rent because 
of the restrictions in Idaho Code §6-303 et. seq. However, Idaho Code §6-303 allows for three day 
notices under situations where rent has not been paid (§6-303(2)) as well as for failure to perform 
other conditions or covenants of the lease (§6-303(3)). Plaintiff had been seeking additional monies 
from defendants for all issues contained in this complaint prior to each of the three-day notices. 
Once the defendants paid the amounts requested in July and September, and the plaintiff accepted 
these payments, the parties fully compromised all amounts due under any lease term as of the date 
of the accord and satisfaction. 
DATED this 21 st day of January, 2010. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and with 
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the 2 I51 day of January, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing TRIAL BRIEF to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below 
their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct postage 
thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below. 
MJW:clm 
BRYAND SMITH ESQ 
B J DRISCOLL ESQ 
PO BOX 50731 
IDAHO FALLS ID 83405-0731 
67 53\028 Trial Brief 
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[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: rf#Esq 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, 





















Case No. CV-08-7258 
On February 9, 2010, a court trial convened at the hour of 
10:10 a.m. in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho, the Honorable 
Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. B. J. Driscoll appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. Mr. 
Dane Watkins Sr. was at counsel table as a representative of the 
Plaintiff. 
Mr. Michael Whyte appeared on behalf of the Defendants. 
Defendant Michael Storms and Kathy Burggraf were present at 
counsel table. 
Upon inquiry from the Court, the parties stated they are 
ready to proceed. 
Mr. Driscoll presented Plaintiff's opening statement. 
MINUTE ENTRY -1-
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Mr. Whyte reserved an opening statement for later. 
Mr. Dane Watkins was called as a witness. He was placed 
under oath and took the stand. Mr. Driscoll inquired of Mr. 
Watkins. Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 - Commercial Lease - was marked, 
offered, and admitted without objection. Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 -
Brownstone Monthly Rent Deposit forms - was marked, offered and 
admitted without objection. Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 - documents re: 
Brownstone monthly gross sales and sales tax payments - was 
marked, offered and admitted without objection. 
A morning recess was conducted. 
Trial resumed at 11:05 a.m. with all parties present. Mr. 
Dane Watkins retook the witness stand subject to direct 
examination by Mr. Driscoll. Plaintiff's Exhibit 26 - 6/12/08 
letters from Smith to Williams and Burggraf - was marked, offered 
and admitted without objection. Plaintiff's Exhibit 24 - 1/08/07 
letter from Watkins to Smith - was marked, offered and admitted 
without objection. Plaintiff's Exhibit 30 - pictures of upstairs 
storage - was marked, offered and admitted without objection. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 32 - photos of sidewalk area - was marked, 
offered and admitted without objection. Plaintiff's Exhibit 31 -
photos of #16 - was marked, offered and admitted without 
objection. Plaintiff's Exhibit 33 - photos of "pipeyard" storage 
area - was marked, offered and admitted without objection. 
Trial recessed for lunch break. Trial will resume at 1:30 
p.m. 
MINUTE ENTRY -2-
Trial continued at 1:36 with all parties present. 
Mr. Dane Watkins retook the witness stand subject to direct 
examination by Mr. B. J. Driscoll. Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 - check 
#3934 dated 3/15/05 from Brownstone Companies to Watkins $1780.00 
- was marked, offered and admitted without objection. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 10 - check #4146 dated 12/23/05 from Brownstone to Watkins 
for $5,000.00 was marked, offered and admitted without 
objection. Plaintiff's Exhibit 14 check #1225 dated 6/21/07 
from Brownstone to Watkins for $500.00 - was marked, offered and 
admitted without objection. Plaintiff's Exhibit 15 - check #4187 
dated 6/22/07 from Watkins to Briggs Roofing for $5500. 00 - was 
marked, offered and admitted. 
Mr. Whyte moved for dismissal of Count 4. 
presented argument in opposition to the motion. 
Mr. Driscoll 
Mr. Driscoll continued direct examination of Mr. Watkins. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 16 - check #4621 dated 12/04/07 from Watkins 
to Waters Construction for $4,000.00 - was marked, offered and 
admitted without objection. Plaintiff's Exhibit 25 - letter dated 
5/5/08 from Watkins to Storms - was marked, offered and admitted. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 18 Three Day Notice to Pay Rent was 
marked, offered and admitted without objection. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 21 - check #1542 dated 7/11/08 from Brownstone to Watkins 
for $17,000.00 was marked, offered and admitted. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 19 - Three Day Notice to Pay Rent of Quit the Premises 
dated 9/12/08 was marked, offered and admitted without 
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objection. Plaintiff's Exhibit 20 - Brownstone Rent Deducted Due 
- was marked, offered and admitted without objection. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 22 - check #1583 dated 9/14/08 from Brownstone to Watkins 
for $6219.00 - was marked offered and admitted. 
An afternoon recess was conducted. 
Trial resumed at 2:25 p.m. with all parties present. 
Mr. Dane Watkins was on the witness stand. Mr. Driscoll 
continued direct examination of Mr. Watkins. Plaintiff's Exhibits 
34, 35 and 37 were admitted for illustrative purposes only. 
Mr. Whyte inquired on cross-examination. Defendant's Exhibit 
C Three Day Notice to Pay Rent was marked, offered and 
admitted without objection. 
Trial was in recess for the day. 
10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, February 10, 2010. 
Trial will continue at 
On February 10, 2010, a court trial reconvened at the hour 
of 10:05 a.m. in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho, the Honorable 
Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. B. J. Driscoll appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. Mr. 
Dane Watkins Sr. was at counsel table as a representative of the 
Plaintiff. 
Mr. Michael Whyte appeared on behalf of the Defendants. 
Defendant Michael Storms and Kathy Burggraf were present at 
MINUTE ENTRY -4-
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counsel table. 
Mr. Dane Watkins retook the witness stand. Mr. Watkins was 
still under oath. Mr. Whyte cross-examined Mr. Watkins. Mr. 
Driscoll inquired on redirect examination. 
(NOTE: There was a power surge off/on with loss of recording. I 
rebooted and did another mic test.) 
(Back on the record) Mr. Driscoll moved to admit Defendant's 
Exhibit A - copy of lease agreement (same as exhibit 1) - for 
clarification purposes. Exhibit A was admitted without objection. 
Mr. Whyte inquired on recross-examination. 
excused form the witness stand. 
Plaintiff rested. 
Mr. Watkins was 
Mrs. Kathy Burggraf was called as a witness and placed under 
oath. Mr. Whyte inquired of Mrs. Burggraf on direct examination. 
A morning recess was conducted. 
Trial resumed at 11:18 a.m. with all parties present. 
Mrs. Kathy Burggraf retook the witness stand subject to 
cross-examination by Mr. Driscoll. Mrs. Burggraf was excused from 
the witness stand. 
Mr. Michael Storms was called as a witness and placed under 
oath. Mr. Whyte inquired on direct examination. 
Trial recessed for lunch break. 
Trial resumed at 1:30 p.m. with all parties present. 
Mr. Michael Storms retook the witness stand subject to direct 
examination by Mr. Whyte. Defendant's Exhibit H - Utility 
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Summation 9/07 - was marked, offered and admitted without 
objection. Defendant's Exhibit I - rent check 9/07 - was marked, 
offered and admitted without objection. Defendant's Exhibit J -
two check stubs - was marked, offered and admitted without 
objection. Mr. Driscoll cross-examined Mr. Storms. The 
Deposition of Michael Storms was published and presented to the 
witness. 
An afternoon recess was conducted. 
Trial continued at 3:42 p.m. with all parties present. 
Mr. Michael Storms retook the witness stand. He was still 
under oath. Mr. Whyte inquired of Mr. Storms on redirect 
examination. Mr. Storms was excused from the witness stand. 
Defendant rested. 
Mr. Dane Watkins was recalled to the witness stand. He was 
still under oath. Mr. Driscoll inquired of Mr. Watkins. Mr. 
Whyte inquired on cross-examination. Mr. Watkins was excused from 
the witness stand. 
Plaintiffs rested on rebuttal. 
The parties agreed to simultaneously submit briefing by 
February 22, 2010 in lieu of closing arguments. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
/)( Q:Gt~K/ 
(drict Judge \..J _/ 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CERTICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the I/ 
caused a true and correct cop~ 
be delivered to the following: 
day of February, 2010, I 
the foregoing document to 
Bryan D. Smith 
B. J. Driscoll 
PO Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Michael J. Whyte 
2635 Channing Way 
























PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT LIST INDEX 
Watkins v. Storms, et al. 
Bonneville County Case No. CV-08-77258 
Trial Date: 02/09/2010 
Description Offer Admit Object 
Commercial Lease and Deposit 
Receipt dated 7/31/1996 with 
Addendum A, Addendum B, Exhibit 1,/ V /V'v 
1/YJ--
C, and Addendum D 
The Watkins Company, LLC 
documents 
Documents re: Brownstone monthly v LI 1}11)11tt/ / 
gross sales and sales tax payments '1 
"Brownstone Monthly Rent Deposit" V forms / ,,1io1JU 
Intentionally omitted 
Intentionally omitted 
Invoice 2005-105 dated 1/21/2005 
from Briggs Roofing to Watkins 
Enterprises for $2,680.00 
Ck #3934 dated 3/15/2005 from 
Brownstone Companies, Inc. to v/ / ·-1J(Y~ 
Watkins Enterprises for $1,780.00 
Ck #2051 stub dated 5/18/2005 from 
The Watkins Company to Briggs 
Roofing for $2,330.00 
Ck #4146 dated 12/23/2005 from 
---(v{i~:,,, Brownstone Companies, Inc. to v v 
Watkins Enterprise for $5,000.00 
Invoice #2006-226 dated 5/2/2006 
from Briggs Roofing to Watkins 
Enterprises for $12,135.00 
Intentionally omitted 
Invoice 120 from Briggs Roofing 
Company to Watkins Enterprise 
Ck #1225 dated 6/21/2007 from 
Brownstone Companies, Inc. to Dane i/. 
Watkins for $500.00 
v"' 011,D'~-)/ 
Ck #4187 dated 6/22/2007 from The 
Watkins Company, LLC to Briggs 1.,/ v'' 0'vlvr,.l- .,/ 
Roofing Company for $5,500.00 
Ck #4621 dated 12/4/2007 from The 
v/ ..11fivfl.-/ Watkins Company, LLC to Waters v· 
Construction for $4,000.00 
Refuse Comment 
Intentionally omitted 
18. Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or 
·v' v,J Quit the Premises dated 7/10/2008 '\I 0' 
19. Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or / v v AU'~/ Quit the Premises dated 9/12/2008 
20. "Brownstone Rent Deducted Due" V v ,/ite1'·tfl,,, V 
21. Ck #1542 dated 7/11/2008 from V / .p--Brownstone Companies, Inc. to # 
Watkins & Watkins for $17,900.00 
22. Ck #1583 dated 9/14/2008 from ,,.,«J,.., / 
Brownstone Companies, Inc. to v / ;r): 
Watkins Enterprises for $6,219.00 
23. Intentionally omitted / 
24. 1/8/2007 letter from Dane Watkins to I I r,/ Marvin Smith 
25. 5/5/2008 letter from Dane Watkins to / 
i'l,,{;1'~ 
Mike Storms •v v 
26. 6/12/2008 letters from Bryan D. v / ~ Smith to Brad Williams and Kathy 
Burggraf 
27. 9/23/2008 letter from Michael J. 
Whyte to Bryan D. Smith 
28. 4/30/2009 letter from B. J. Driscoll 
to Michael J. Whyte 
29. 4/13/2009 letter from B. J. Driscoll 
to Michael J. Whyte 
30. Photos of upstairs storage area ~ V ;rw)'I.L/ 
31. Photos of Space #16 V i( 'i'1AiYLQ/ 
32. Photos of sidewalk area V 1/ l'\nl1P) 
33. Photos of "pipeyard" storage area v v '-r11r·11 V / 
34. Rent, Late Fees, And Interest \ l \u5(-Summary 
35. Unjust Enrichment Summary ·1 11 tl '71 
36. Intentionally omitted 
37. Total Damage Summary i\ \ u_c;t. 
38. Expired gifts certificates from 
Brownstone 
39. Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff's 
First Set of Interrogatories dated 
7/7/2009 
40. Defendants' Responses to Plaintiff's 
First Set of Requests for Production 
dated 7/7/2009 
41. Defendants' Supplemental 
Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of 









Defendants· Supplemental Answers 
to Plaintiffs First Set of 
Interrogatories dated l 0/27 /2009 
Defendants' Second Supplemental 
Responses to Plaintiff's First set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production dated l l/12/2009 
Affidavit of Michael Storms dated 
12/10/2009 
Affidavit of Michael Storms dated 
7/28/2009 
Affidavit of Michael Storms in 
Support of his Objection to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment dated 
12/23/2009 








Michael J. Whyte, Esq., ISB #4645 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way ,,. 




Attorney for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STAJ'E OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 














Case No. CV-08-7258 
POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
ACCELERATION OF RENT 
COME NOW defendants, by and through their attorney of record and hereby submit this 
Post-Trial Memorandum regarding the acceleration of rent. At the conclusion of the trial there 
remained the issue of whether plaintiff was entitled to an acceleration of rent if the court finds 
defendants in default of the parties' lease agreement. This memorandum will address that single 
issue. 
During the trial there was a question whether the plaintiff was seeking an eviction of 
defendants if the Court finds that there was a breach of the lease. Without waiving any defenses 
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presented during the trial, but for purposes of this memorandum it will be presumed that defendants 
breached the lease and the plaintiff is seeking an eviction based on that breach. 
The lease agreement between the parties contains a clause outlining the possible damages 
afforded the owner if there is a breach. One such remedy is the amount of unpaid rent for the 
balance of the term of the lease. Plaintiff seeks this acceleration of the rent not yet due. During the 
trial plaintiff testified that if there is an eviction plaintiff will be in control of the property subject 
to this lease and would have the opportunity to rent it to a third party. 
Plaintiff has an affirmative duty to mitigate his damages through finding a new tenant and 
renting the available space. This rule was outlined and upheld in Industrial Leasing Corporation 
v. Thomason, 96 ID 574, 532 P.2d 916 (1974). 
However, it is our view that the best rule is that suggested in Young Electric Sign Co. 
v. Capps, supra, i.e. that a lessor should be required to mitigate his damages through 
a reasonable endeavor to relet the property unless the property is so unique that it 
could be said as a matter of law that reasonable efforts would not be productive. 
Such a rule would discourage idleness of productive property and would be in 
keeping with the other generally accepted damages rules in other commercial 
transactions. E.g., in the rental ofreal property, most jurisdictions place a duty upon 
a landlord to seek new tenants when the lessees have refused to pay rent as provided 
in the lease agreement and have vacated the property. Martin v; Siegley, 123 Wash. 
683, 212 P. 1057 (1923); Wright v. Baumann, 239 Or. 410, 398 P .2d 119 (1965). As 
stated by the Oregon Supreme Court in the Wright case: 
"*** [I]t is important that the rules for awarding damages should be such as 
to discourage even persons against whom wrongs have been committed from 
passively suffering economic loss which could be averted by reasonable efforts***." 
McCormick, Damages, p.127 (1935). 398 P.2d at 121. 
Thomason at 577. 
This application outlined in Thomason was applied to a real property lease in Olsen v. 
Country Club Sport, Inc., 110 Idaho 789, 718 P.2d 1227 (1985). In Olsen, the landlord (Olsen) 
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brought an action for damages, following a default of lease and retaking possession of the leased 
premises. Prior to the lawsuit being filed, Olsen served on defendants a notice of breach and 
specifically advised that he was electing to immediately accelerate all rent due under the agreement. 
Because defendants could not cure the default, Olsen took possession of the lease property and filed 
suit for damages, including rent which was accelerated pursuant to the written lease provisions. 
With regard to the accelerated provision of the lease, the Idaho Supreme Court stated the following: 
The trial court correctly noted that where a lessee has breached a lease before 
expiration of the lease's term has occurred, the lessor, at common law, had three 
remedies: ( l) treating the lease as terminated and resuming possession; (2) retaking 
possession of the premises for the benefit of the lessee, and holding the lessee liable 
for the difference in rent between what he or she in good faith was able to recover by 
reletting the premises and what was due under the lease; and (3) doing nothing and 
collecting the full rent due under the lease. Centurian Development Ltd. v. Kenford 
Co., 60 A.D.2d 96,400 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1977). 
The trial court also correctly noted that the third option is no longer as viable as in 
former times, at least in some contexts. In Industrial Leasing Corp. v. Thomason, 96 
Idaho 574,532 P.2d 916 (1974), our Supreme Court provided us with the guidance 
of this holding: 
We therefore hold that the lessor of personal property is not 
unconditionally entitled to the full amount of the rentals reserved in 
the lease as damages in the event of breach of the lease. If the leased 
property is of such a kind that the lessor may reasonably anticipate the 
existence of a market for its re-lease or sale, the lessor is under a duty 
to use "commercially reasonable" efforts to release or sell the 
property to mitigate damages according to the following rules: 
1. If the lessee notifies the lessor of his intention not to continue the lease, 
or if the lessor becomes aware of the lessee's intention not to perform the 
lease by breach or otherwise, and if the leased property is returned to the 
lessor or made available to the lessor, then the lessor is under a duty to 
attempt to mitigate the damages sustained by the lessee's breach by re-
leasing or selling the property and setting off the amount received against the 
damages sustained by reason of the lessee's breach of the lease. If a good faith 
attempt to rent or sell the property proves fruitless, the lessor is entitled to his 
full rental payment, plus expenses reasonably incurred in attempting to re-
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lease or sell the property less expenses of performance saved by the breach 
(e.g., costs of maintenance, insurance, etc.). If the property is released in good 
faith (i.e., at a rate or price which is commercially reasonable under the 
circumstances of the case), the lessor's damages are the rental called for in the 
breached lease, together with the reasonable expenses of preserving the 
property and re-leasing it, less the amount received in mitigation by the 
release and any expenses of performance saved by the breach of the lease. See 
Bennett v. Associated Food Stores, Inc., 118 Ga.App. 711, 165 S.E.2d 581 
(1968); see also, Uniform Commercial Code-Sales, Part 7, Remedies, LC.§§ 
28-2-701 to 28-2-710, for treatment of the analogous problem under the law 
of sales. Id. at 577, 532 P.2d at 919 (footnote omitted) (emphasis 
added).(fn3). 
Olsen at 794. 
In this action, under the lease agreement the plaintiff has the option to continue the lease even 
if there has been a breach of the lease. If plaintiff takes this option, plaintiff would clearly not be 
entitled to any accelerated rent because he would receive the rent as it was paid in future 
installments. During the trial, plaintiff was inconsistent with his testimony as to whether he would 
be seeking an eviction or a continuation of the lease. Plaintiff testified several times that he did not 
want to evict defendants and just wanted to be made whole by the payment of the past due rent. 
There were other times when plaintiff testified that he wanted to evict. Given the inconsistent 
testimony, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine plaintiffs request of the Court. However, 
for purpose of this memorandum, as stated earlier, presuming the plaintiff will seek an eviction, the 
plaintiff still must mitigate his damages prior to receiving any accelerated rent damages. The lease 
allows for payment of accelerated rent upon a breach; however, as outlined in both Thomason and 
Olsen, the rule in Idaho is that plaintiff must mitigate the damages by "commercially reasonable" 
efforts to release the property. There was no testimony that the property is of such unique nature that 
reasonable efforts to re-lease would not be productive. It is a finished building located along the 
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Snake River in Idaho Falls, Idaho and therefore presumable would be attractive to other potential 
tenants. Because of plaintiffs duty to mitigate its damages, and no evidence to suggest that it would 
be unable to lease this space, no acceleration of lease is ordered and that claim of defendants is 
denied. 
Plaintiff wants to shift the burden to mitigate its damages by requiring defendants to come 
forward with evidence that plaintiff would be able to re-lease the property in mitigation. First of all, 
if plaintiff is in possession of the real property there is nothing to suggest that it would not be able 
to re-lease the property. Second, this would completely undo plaintiffs duty and place plaintiff in 
a position to obtain a windfall. Without requiring plaintiff to first actually mitigate its damages 
before any award of accelerated damages, plaintiff would be in a position wherein it receives 
accelerated damages from defendants and receives rental income when it re-leases the property. This 
would be contrary to the policy stated in Young Electric Sign Co. v Capps 94 Idaho 518, 49 l P.2d 
57 ( 1971) and confirmed in Thomason: "[A]s a general proposition ... the purpose or objective of the 
court is to place the injured party ... in the position no better and no worse than he would have 
occupied had the contract been performed." King v. Beatrice Foods, 89 Idaho 52, 58-59, 402 P.2d 
966, 969 (1965); Young Electric Sign 94 Idaho at 522; Thomason at 577. 
To allow plaintiff recovery of accelerated damages without the requirement of mitigation first 
would in essence be considered a penalty imposed against defendants. Contractual provisions which 
include penalties are void and unenforceable. 
Generally speaking, parties to a contract may agree upon liquidated damages in 
anticipation of a breach, in any case where the circumstances are such that accurate 
determination of the damages would be difficult or impossible, and provided that the 
liquidated damages fixed by the contract bear a reasonable relation to actual 
damages. But, where the forfeiture or damage fixed by the contract is arbitrary and 
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bears no reasonable relation to the anticipated damage, and is exorbitant and 
unconscionable, it is regarded as a 'penalty,' and the contractual provision therefor is 
void and unenforceable." Graves v. Cupic, 75 Idaho 451 at 456, 272 P.2d 1020 at 
1023 (1954). 
Young Electric Sign 94 Idaho at 521. 
In this case awarding the claimed accelerated rent payments without requiring mitigation 
results in a penalty because there is no relation between this amount and the anticipated damage. 
The amount sought to enforce is further exorbitant and unconscionable. The lease between plaintiffs 
and defendants has an additional eighteen years remaining. Plaintiff seeks immediate payment of 
the next eighteen years rent without having to mitigate its damages. However this amount sought 
bears no reasonable relation to plaintiffs anticipated damages. Plaintiff testified that with an 
eviction it would be in control of the real property and would be able to lease the property to a third 
party. It can be anticipated that the plaintiff will be able to re-lease the property in the future and 
recover most, if not all, of the rent which would be due under the lease. Again, requiring defendant 
to provide evidence of the ability to lease the premises instead of requiring plaintiff to mitigate the 
damages would allow the plaintiff to recover damages far in excess of the anticipated damages and 
would be contrary to the policy of placing an injured party in a position no better and no worse than 
had the original lease been performed. 
The requested accelerated damages are further a penalty because there exists the actual ability 
to accurately determine the damages which plaintiff might suffer. The damages can be accurately 
determined by requiring mitigation first and then calculating the difference (if any) between what 
would be received under this lease and the amount to be received under the lease to the third party. 
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Allowing recovery of the full accelerated rent plus additional amounts to be received after plaintiff 
leases to a third party is exorbitant and unconscionable. This penalty should not be allowed. 
Because there are still questions regarding plaintiffs actual damages, and the rental value that 
will be received after mitigation, the Court should deny plaintiffs request for accelerated rent. At 
the most, the Court could reserve this ruling until such time as the plaintiff actually mitigates the 
damages so that no penalty is assessed against defendants and plaintiff is placed in a position no 
better and no worse than if the lease were completed. 
DATED this 22nd day of February, 2010. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and with 
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the 22nd day of February, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM: ACCELERATION OF RENT to be served 
upon the following persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said document 
in the United States mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting 
by facsimile as set forth below. 
MJW:clm 
BRYAN D SMITH ESQ 
B J DRISCOLL ESQ 
PO BOX 50731 
IDAHO FALLS ID 83405-0731 
675 3\030 Post-trial Memo 
[ ] Mail 
[X] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411 
B . .1. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls. Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MICHAEL STORMS and KA THY 
BURGGRAF, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-7258 
PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING BRIEF 
COMES NOW the plaintiff: The Watkins Company, LLC, an Idaho Limited 
Liability Company ("Watkins"), by and through counsel of record, and submits its 
closing brief. For the convenience of the court, Watkins has organized its arguments in 
relation to the ten counts contained in its Amended Complaint. In light of the evidence 
from trial and the applicable law, the comi should enter judgment against the defendants, 
Michael Storms ("Storms") and Kathy Burggraf ("Burggraf'), as set forth herein. 
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I. THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT fOR WATKINS ON COUNT 
ONE IN THE AMOUNT OF $28,988 BECAUSE STORMS MATERIALLY 
BREACHED THE LEASE BY FAILING TO PAY RENT AND LATE FEES. 
A. Storms Breached The Lease By Failing To Pay Percentage Rent To 
Watkins. 
This court previously rules as a matter of law that the language from Addendum 
A of the Commercial Lease and Deposit Receipt ("Lease") is unambiguous and provides 
"for payment ofrent through the term of the Lease (not including the initial months of the 
lease covered by prepaid rent) of 5% of gross sales, if such amount exceeds the 
designated base amount of rent." 1 
By his own admission at trial, Storms did not pay Watkins over $20,000 of the 
percentage rent due since November 2003. 2 This court should conclude that Storms 
breached the Lease by not paying the percentage rent. 
B. Storms Breached The Lease By Failing To Pay Late Fees To Watkins. 
The Lease provides that if the rent "is not paid within 2 days after due date, 
Tenant agrees to pay a late charge of $100 plus interest at 1 % per month on the 
delinquent amount."3 Unfortunately, the Lease does not establish a "due date." 
At trial, the parties disagreed on the due date. Watkins claimed that the due date 
was the first day of each month. Dane Watkins testified that the first date of the month is 
the due date for the 40-plus leases Watkins manages and the custom in this area. He 
testified that he had tried for years to have Storms pay the rent on the first. Storms never 
testified to a specific due date, but argued that the due date was sometime between the 
8th to the 12th of the month after the release of the electricity bill. 
1 Seep. 1 of Order filed January 8, 2010. 
2 The damages Watkins seeks in this action only go back to November 2003 based on the applicable statute 
of limitations. 
3 See 12 of Plaintiffs Exhibit l. 
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"Unless otherwise agreed, periodic rent is payable at the beginning of any term of 
one month or less and otherwise in equal monthly installments at the beginning of each 
month." UNJFORM RESIDENTTAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT§ 1.401(c).4 Fm1her, if a 
lease agreement does not expressly identify the date that rent payments are due each 
month, then the rent is due on the date "either expressly made or to be gathered by 
necessary implication from the acts and circumstances of the pai1ies or by custom or 
usage in the community." 49 AM.JUR.2D Landlord and Tenant § 555. 5 
Here, the com1 should find the "due date" was the first clay of each month because 
the Lease did not establish a specific due date. See UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & 
TENANT ACT, supra. Further, Watkins' testimony is evidence of the custom and usage in 
the community that monthly rent is due on the first of each month. See 49 AM.JUR.2D 
landlord and Tenant§ 555. 
At trial, Storms did not identify a specific date when the rent is due each month. 
As a matter of horn book law, "In construing a written instrument, this Comi must 
consider it as a whole and give meaning to all provisions of the writing to the extent 
possible."' Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 135 Idaho 434,437 (2000). Further, "as 
between two permissible constructions, that which establishes a valid contract is 
preferred to one which does not, since it is reasonable to suppose that the paiiies meant 
something by their agreement, and were not engaged in an attempt to do a vain and 
meaningless thing." Morgan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506, 519 (1948). 
Storms' interpretation would render the express late charge of $100 meaningless because 
4 Although it appears the Idaho Legislature has not formally adopted the Uniform Landlord and Tenant Act, 
ldaho appellate cou11s have cited the Act with approval. See Wright v. Brady, 126 ldaho 671, 674 (Ct.App. 
1995). 
5 Idaho appellate com1s routinely cite 49 AM.JUR.2D Landlord and Tenant with approval. See, e.g., JR. 
Simplot Co. v. Rycair, Inc., 138 Idaho 557,564 (2003). 
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he never identifies a due date that would trigger the two day grace period and the 
subsequent late charge. Such an interpretation is disfavored at law. 
Based on the foregoing, this court should find that the "due date" for the monthly 
rent was the first day of each month. Because Watkins testified and Sto1ms admitted that 
Storms never paid the rent by the first, this court should find that Storms did not pay rent 
by the due date each month and conclude that Storms breached the Lease in this regard. 
C. Storms Breached The Lease By Failing To Pay Interest To Watkins. 
The Lease expressly provides that the tenants are liable for "1 % per month on the 
delinquent amount."6 The undisputed evidence at trial showed Storms failed to pay over 
$20,000 in percentage rent since November 2003. ln Watkins' evidence and accounting, 
Storms never paid any interest on past due, "delinquent" amounts. For his part, Storms 
never claimed to have paid any interest on these past due amounts. As such, Storms has 
breached the Lease by failing to pay interest expressly required on delinquent amounts. 
Because interest is typically a post-judgment issue, and because the amount of Storms' 
liability for interest depends on the amount of Sto1ms' liability on the other claims, 
Watkins cannot provide an accurate amount of interest due pursuant to the Lease, but 
reserves the issue for determination after entry of judgment. 
D. Storms Failed To Establish His Affirmative Defense Of Accord And 
Satisfaction. 
Idaho Code Section 28-3-310 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION BY USE OF TI~STRUMENT. (1) If a 
person against whom a claim is asserted proves that (i) that person in good 
faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full satisfaction of the 
claim, (ii) the amount of the claim was unliguidated or subject to a bona 
fide dispute, and (iii) the claimant obtained payment of the instrument, the 
following subsections apply. 
6 See ~2 of Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. 
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(2) Unless subsection (3) of this section applies, the claim is 
discharged if the person against whom the claim is asse1ied proves that the 
instrument or an accompanying written communication contained a 
conspicuous statement to the effect that the instrument was tendered as 
full satisfaction of the claim. 
( 4) A claim is discharged if the person against whom the claim is 
asserted proves that within a reasonable time before collection of the 
instrument was initiated, the claimant, or an agent of the claimant having 
direct responsibility with respect to the disputed obligation, knew that the 
instrument was tendered in full satisfaction of the claim. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In Ashby v. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 69 (1979), the Idaho Supreme Court 
explained as follows: 
This Comi has held that in order for the acceptance of a check to 
amount to an accord and satisfaction, where it is for a lesser sum than 
claimed by the creditor to be due, the conditions must be plain, definite 
and certain by the debtor that he is giving such check in complete 
settlement of the account between him and his creditor and that 
acceptance thereof shall close the account or controversy . ... An accord 
and satisfaction cannot arise by reason of the payment of a sum less than is 
due, unless it clearly appears not only that this was the intention of the 
payor, but also the payee express()' agreed to it or was bound to know of 
the intention at the time of the acceptance. It cannot be too strongly 
stated that an accord and satisfaction can never be implied from 
language of doubtful meaning . ... [A]n agreement to compromise or 
settle a claim is essential to finding an accord and satisfaction ... 
(Emphasis added.) As the Idaho Supreme Comi explained more recently, "Since an 
accord and satisfaction is a substituted contract, the essentials of a valid contract must be 
present, including: proper subject matter, competent parties, a meeting of the minds, and 
consideration." Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 909 (2009) (citation omitted). 
Here, Storms argues that his $17,900 payment in response to the July 2008 three 
day notice constituted an accord and satisfaction-and then his subsequent payment of 
$6,219 in response to the September 2008 three-day notice constituted another accord 
PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING BRIEF- Page 5 
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\7973\Pleadings\040 Closing Brief.doc 
1 7 :J 
and satisfaction. However, Storms has failed to prove the necessary elements for this 
defense. 
Importantly, Storms failed to prove that either of his checks "contained a 
conspicuous statement to the effect that the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of 
the claim.'· I.C. § 28-3-310. The $17,900 check gives no indication that he intended the 
payment to fully satisfy a disputed claim. 7 The $6,219 check is similarly deficient of any 
language suggesting Storms intended the payment to fully satisfy the claim. 8 Storms' 
checks contained no language suggesting "payment in full" or "without recourse" or any 
similar language indicating the "instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the 
claim.'· As such, Storms cannot establish an accord and satisfaction under Idaho Code 
Section 28-3-310. 
Stated another way, Storms failed to provide "plain, definite and certain" 
language that he paid the checks "in complete settlement of the account between him and 
his creditor." See Ashby, supra. Storms testified that he never communicated with 
Watkins about either of the three-day notices. He just received them and paid them. As 
such, Storms failed to prove he "clearly" expressed his intention to Watkins that the 
payment was in full satisfaction. Further, there was no evidence that Watkins "expressly 
agreed to [Storms' intention] or was bound to know of the intention at the time of 
acceptance." Id. 
Essentially, Storms asks this court to imply an accord and satisfaction from his 
payments to Watkins based on the reference to "compliance with the lease" contained in 
the three-day notices, but the Idaho Supreme Court has clearly stated that "an accord and 
7 See Plaintiffs Exhibit 21. 
8 See Plaintiffs Exhibit 22. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING BRIEF - Page 6 
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\7973\Pleadings\040 Closing Brief.doc 4 r, 0 .l c:s 
satisfaction can never be implied.from language of doub(ful meaning." See Ashby, 
supra. The evidence showed a complete lack of communication between Watkins and 
Storms. Storms himself testified that he merely "hoped" that the $6,219 payment would 
resolve all issues between him and Watkins. Viewing the accord and satisfaction as a 
"substituted contract," since there was no requisite "meeting of the minds," see Shore, 
supra, there can be no accord and satisfaction. 
E. The Court Should Enter Judgment To Watkins On Cow1t I In The Amount 
Of $28,988. 
Watkins claims that Storms owed $21,888 in unpaid percentage rent.9 Storn1s 
agreed with Watkins' calculations except he claimed credit for an additional percentage 
rent payment of $930 in August-September 2007. However, the $930 does not match 
with the amounts due in August and September 2007. In fact, the $930 is greater than the 
amounts due at that time. On the other hand, Watkins testified that the Lease required 
Storms to make payments to Watkins for property taxes and that Storms' prope1iy tax 
payments for 2008 and 2009 were around $900. This court should give greater weight to 
Watkins' testimony than Storms. For Storms to claim he overpaid the actual percentage 
rent due despite having the infonnation necessary to calculate the exact amount due 
within his possession is not credible in light of his more consistent refusal to pay any 
percentage rent. On the other hand, Watkins' testimony is more credible that Storms 
owes $21,888 in unpaid percentage rent. 
The parties agree that Storms and Burggraf never paid the rent on the first of the 
month for the 75 month period from November 2003 through February 2010. Storms and 
Burggraf paid the $100 per month late fee for 4 months from April 2008 through July 
9 See Plaintiffs Exhibit 34. 
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2008, but did not pay the $100 per month late fee for the remaining 71 months, for a total 
of$7,100. 
As such, the court should enter judgment to Watkins against Storms and Burggraf 
on Count I in the total amount of $28,988. 
II. THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT FOR WATKINS ON COUNT 
TWO IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,007,500 BECAUSE THE ACCELERATION 
CLAUSE IS AN ENFORCEABLE CONTRACTUAL REMEDY. 
A. The Acceleration Clause In The Lease Is Enforceable As The Lessor's 
Contractual Remedy. 
Paragraph 22 of the Lease, captioned "REMEDIES OF OWNER ON 
DEF AULT," provides in pertinent part as follows: 
In the event of any breach of this lease by Lessee, Lessor may, at 
his option, terminate the lease and recover from Lessee: (a) the worth at 
the time of the award of the unpaid rent which was earned at the time of 
termination; (b) the worth at the time of award of the amount by which 
the unpaid rent which would have been earned after termination until 
the time of the award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that the 
Lessee [i.e., Storms] proves could have been reasonably avoided; ( c) the 
worth at the time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent for the 
balance of the term after the time of award exceeds the amount of such 
rental loss that Lessee [i.e., Storms] proves could be reasonably avoided; 
and ( d) any other amount necessary to compensate Lessor for all detriment 
proximately caused by Lessee's failure to perform his obligations under 
the lease or which in the ordinary course of things would be likely to result 
therefrom. 10 
Idaho law recognizes the enforceability of acceleration clauses in general. See 
Parrott v. Wallace, 127 Idaho 306, 310-311 (Ct.App. 1995). As to commercial leases 
specifically, the Idaho Supreme Court has enforced a judgment for accelerated lease 
payments. LeaseFirst v. Burns, 131 Idaho 158 (1998). 
10 See~ 22 of Plaintiffs Exhibit l (emphasis added). See also~ 22 of Defendants' Exhibit "A" admitted 
for the limited purpose of providing any language rendered unreadable by the hole punches in Plaintiffs 
Exhibit I. 
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Discussing the purpose and validity of accelerated rent clauses, one Pennsylvania 
court explained, "The acceleration clause is viewed as a guarantee to the lessor that he 
will receive immediately all of the monies ( or other compensation) to which he is entitled 
under the lease without having to harass a reluctant tenant as periodical payments 
become due." Pierce v. Hoffstot, 236 A.2d 828, 803 (Pa.Super. 1967) (emphasis added). 
Numerous federal and state jurisdictions enforce accelerated rent clauses in 
commercial leases like the contractual remedy in paragraph 22 of the Lease in the present 
case. See, e.g., Westfield Franklin Park Mall LLC v. Vanity Shop of Grand Forks, Inc., 
642 F.Supp.2d 756, 757 (N.D.Ohio 2008); Ona! v. BP Amoco Corp., 275 F.Supp.2d 650 
(E.D.Pa. 2003); W & Ci Seaford Assocs. v. Eastern Shore Mkts., 714 F.Supp. 1336, 1346-
49 (D.Del.1989); Cummings Properties, LLC v. Nat '1 Communications Corp., 869 
N.E.2d 617, 620-622 (Mass. 2007); Aurora Business Park Associates .. L.P. v. lvfichael 
Albert, Inc., 548 N.W.2d 153 (Iowa 1996); FifiyStates Mgmt. Corp. v. Pioneer Auto 
Parks. Inc .. 389 N.E.2d 113 (N.Y. 1979) (enforcing acceleration ofremaining monthly 
rent due under 20-year lease). 
Most of the courts analyzing these accelerated rent clauses determine whether the 
remedy is an enforceable liquidated damage clause or an unenforceable penalty. In 
Cummings Properties, LLC v. Nat '1 Communications Corp., 869 N.E.2d 617, 620-622 
(Mass. 2007), the court explained as follows: 
It is well settled that a contract provision clearly and reasonably 
establishing liquidated damages should be enforced so long as it is not so 
disproportionate to anticipated damages as to constitute a penalty .... 
While any reasonable doubt whether a provision constitutes a valid 
liquidated damages clause is to be resolved in favor of the aggrieved paiiy, 
the party challenging it bears the burden of establishing that the damages 
to which it agreed are disproportionate to a reasonable estimate of those 
actual damages likely to result from a breach. 
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See also W & G Seaford Assocs. v. Eastern Shore Mkts., 714 F.Supp. 1336, 1346-49 
(D.Del.1989); JMD Holding Corp. v. Congress Fin. Corp., 828 N.E.2d 604 (N.Y. 2005): 
Aurora Business Park Associates, L.P. v .. Michael Albert, Inc., 548 N.W.2d 153 (Iowa 
1996). 
Only in the most limited circumstances will an accelerated rent clause be held 
unenforceable. One court explained as follows: 
Thus, i11 rare cases, agreements providing for the acceleration of 
the entire debt upon the default of the obligor may be circumscribed or 
denied enforcement by utilization of equitable principles. In the vast 
majority of instances, however, these clauses have been enforced at law in 
accordance with their terms. Absent some element of fraud, exploitive 
overreaching or unconscionable conduct on the part of the landlord to 
exploit a technical breach, there is no warrant, either in law or equity, 
for a court to refuse enforcement of the agreement of the parties. 
Fifty S'tates Mgmt. Corp. v. Pioneer Auto Parks. Inc., 389 N.E.2d 113, 116 (N.Y. 
1979) ( emphasis added). 
Coming back to Idaho law, an enforceable liquidated damage provision must 
satisfy two requirements. "First, an accurate determination of the actual damages that 
might be incurred upon breach must be difficult or impossible to determine. Second, the 
amount of the liquidated damages must bear a reasonable relationship to the actual 
damages anticipated to be incurred." Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 
258-259 (1993) (reversing a trial comi's refusal to enforce a liquidated damage clause). 
Here. this court should enforce the accelerated rent clause in paragraph 22 of the 
Lease as an enforceable liquidated damage provision. In Paragraph 22, Stonns and 
Burggraf agreed in the event of their breach of the Lease, \Vatkins had the right to 
recover unpaid past rent. the rent due until a court award, and the "unpaid rent for the 
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balance of the term after the time of award" minus "the amount of such rental loss that 
Lessee [i.e., Storms and Burggraf] proves could be reasonably avoided." 11 In other 
words, Storms and Burggraf agreed to acceleration of all rents due for the balance of the 
Lease, minus the amount of rent they proved could be reasonably avoided. 
Importantly, Storms and Burggraf offered no evidence of the amount of future 
rent that could be reasonably avoided. Thus, Storms and Burggraf failed to establish any 
proof to justify an adjustment to the amount of future rent they owe under the Lease. 
By seeking to enforce the acceleration clause, Watkins seeks nothing more than 
the benefit of its bargain under the Lease. Paragraph 22 requires payment of only the 
base rents due through the rest of the lease term. By seeking acceleration of rents due, 
Watkins should receive the amounts due under the Lease "without having to harass a 
reluctant tenant as periodical payments become due." Pierce, supra. As the evidence at 
trial clearly demonstrated, Storms is a very "reluctant" tenant. He refused to pay the 
percentage rent and provide the monthly sales reports both before and after this court 
ruled as a matter of law that he owed the percentage rent. Storms withheld partial-and 
then entire-monthly rent payments because his customers could not cross a bridge he 
admitted was unsafe, even though his customers could still access his business by two 
o1.her vehicular bridges, one pedestrian bridge, and the street in front of the Brownstone. 
Watkins has attempted for several years to receive the rent to which it is entitled. 
Enforcing paragraph 22 simply ensures Storms and Burggraf s obligation to pay the rent 
without further action. 
11 See~ 22 of Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. See also~ 22 of Defendants' Exhibit "A" admitted for the limited 
purpose of providing any language rendered unreadable by the hole punches in Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. 
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By enforcing paragraph 22, this court will be enforcing a valid liquidated damage 
provision w1der Idaho law. See Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, supra. An accurate 
determination of Watkins' actual damages is difficult or impossible to determine because 
the Lease entitles Watkins to the greater of the base rent or 5% of the gross sales. In 
recent years, the percentage rent has been greater than the base rent, but not every month 
and not by the same amount. 12 To calculate the exact amount of base rent or percentage 
rent due each month over the next 17 years would be difficult or impossible. However, 
the amount of Watkins" remedy under paragraph 22 does bear a reasonable relationship 
to the actual damages Watkins will incur because paragraph 22 is based on the actual 
base rent, which is the minimum rental amount due for the balance of the lease term. 
As a matter of law, any reasonable doubt whether paragraph 22 constitutes a valid 
liquidated damage clause is to be resolved in favor of Watkins. Cummings Properties, 
LLC, supra. Storms and Burggraf offered no evidence at trial of any "fraud, exploitive 
overreaching or unconscionable conduct" by Watkins that could justify any equitable 
limitation of paragraph 22. See F(fry States, supra. 
B. The Court Should Enter Judgment To Watkins On Count II In The 
Amount Of $1,007,500. 
In its original complaint, its amended complaint, and again at trial, Watkins 
sought payment for all accelerated amounts due under paragraph 22 of the Lease. 
Despite this repeated demand, Storms and Burggraf presented no evidence at trial of the 
rental amount that Watkins could have reasonably avoided against future rents. As such, 
this court should enforce paragraph 22 against Storms and Burggraf and enter judgment 
to Watkins in the amount of $1,007,500 as shown in Plaintiffs Exhibit 37. 
12 See Plaintiffs Exhibit 34. 
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III. THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT FOR WATKINS ON COUNT 
THREE BECAUSE STORMS MATERIALLY BREACHED THE LEASE BY 
FAILING TO PROVIDE MONTHLY SALES REPORTS AND REVOKING 
THE POWER OF ATTORNEY. 
Addendum A of the Lease requires that Storms and Burggraf provide monthly 
sales reports for the Brownstone. 13 Storms admitted at trial that he did not provide 
Watkins these reports. When Watkins tried to acquire these sales figures from the Idaho 
State Tax Commission pursuant to the power of attorney language 111 Addendum A of the 
Lease, Storms testified at trial that he revoked the power of attorney and instructed the 
tax commission to not provide any more information to Watkins. Because Storms 
refused to provide the monthly sales information to Watkins and then revoked the power 
of attorney that purpo1ied to allow Watkins to request that information directly from the 
tax commission, Storms breached the Lease. The damages resulting from this breach of 
Count III are essentially the same percentage rent damages as outlined in Count I. As 
such, the court should enter judgment against Storms and Burggraf for $21,888. 
IV. THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT FOR WATKINS ON COUNT 
FOUR IN THE AMOUNT OF $4,000 BECAUSE STORMS IS RESPONSIBLE 
FOR ROOF REPAIRS ON THE PREMISES. 
Addendum B to the Lease provides for the maintenance responsibilities on the 
Brownstone property identified as an "L" for the landlord's responsibility, or a "T" for 
the tenant's responsibility. For roof repairs, the Lease provides "T¾." 14 
A. The Lease Reference To "T¾" For Roof Repair Responsibility Is 
Ambiguous. 
Idaho case law provides, "Under contract law, the determination that a document 
is ambiguous is a question of law, but interpretation of that ambiguous term presents a 
13 See Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. 
14 See Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. 
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question of fact. Such interpretations require a trier a fact to discern the intent of the 
contracting parties, generally by considering the objective and purpose of the provision 
and the circumstances surrounding the formation of the agreement." State v. Allen, 143 
Idaho 267, 272 (Ct.App. 2006) ( citations omitted) ( emphasis added). Further, in 
interpreting ambiguous contract terms, "the district court may consider the objective and 
purpose of the agreement and the conduct of the parties to the agreement." Bischo_[f v. 
Quang-Watkins Properties, 113 Idaho 826,829 (Ct.App. 1987) (citations omitted) 
( emphasis added). 
The parties dispute the meaning of the "To/a" reference for roofrepair 
responsibilities. Because the percentage in "To/a" is not defined, the Lease contains a 
patent ambiguity. 
B. The Court Should Construe "To/a" To Mean That Storms and Burggraf Are 
Responsible For Their Percentage Of The Entire Building. 
Because "T%" is patently ambiguous, the court must determine the meaning of 
"To/o" in light of the purpose of the provision, the circumstances surrounding the 
formation, and the conduct of the parties. See Allen and Bischoff, supra. 
Watkins testified that "To/a" referred to the tenant's portion of the bui ]ding vis-a-
vis the entire building, which was approximately 58-60% of the whole building. Watkins 
testified that this Lease was a triple net lease. The objective of a long-term triple net 
lease is to places the uncertainty of future repairs on the tenant. Watkins was not willing 
to pay for 50% of future roof repairs because the roof would likely need some repairs 
before the end of the 30-year lease term. As such, Watkins emphatically testified that the 
roof was the tenant's responsibility, that Addendum B did not say "L %" suggesting the 
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roof repair was the landlord's responsibility, but "T%" demonstrating the repairs were the 
tenant's responsibility. Watkins' testimony aligns with the objective of the provision. 
On the other hand, Storms opined at trial that "T%" meant he was responsible for 
only 50% of his portion of the building, which was approximately 60% of the entire 
building. However, Storms' conduct undermines his interpretation. The record is 
undisputed that he paid 100% of his share of first half of the first half of the roof repairs. 
Briggs Roofing initially repaired one-half of the building's roof, which included about 
20-30 feet of the Brownstone's po1iion of the building. Storms paid 100% of this portion 
in the amount of $1,780. 15 Then, Storms paid an additional $5,500 for the repairs on the 
remainder of the roof. 16 Watkins paid this entire $5,500 to Briggs for the roof 17 Thus, 
the evidence at trial proved that Storms paid 100% of the roof repairs for the 
Brownstone's portion of the building. Storms can point to no evidence at trial that 
Watkins independently paid anything for roofrepairs. 
Moreover, if "To/o" was meant to be 50% for Watkins and 50% for Storms of only 
the Brownstone's portion of the building, then the pmiies could have easily defined the 
roof repair responsibility as "TSO%" just as they did for the utility bill responsibility on 
that same page. 18 However, in light of both parties' testimony that they were unsure of 
the exact percentage of the Brownstone's portion of the entire building (i.e., somewhere 
around 60%), a general reference to the tenant's percentage, or "T%," is a more 
reasonable and likely more accurate construction of the ambiguous lease term. 
15 See Plaintiff's Exhibit 8. 
16 See Plaintiff's Exhibits 10 and 14. 
17 See Plaintiff's Exhibit 15. 
18 See Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. 
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C. Stonns Must Reimburse Watkins $4,000 For Roof Repairs. 
Other than an amount paid by Watkins to Waters Construction, Storms has paid 
l 00% of the roof repairs for the Brownstone's po11ion of the building. Watkins testified 
that after problems v-.rith Briggs Roofing on the second half of the building, Waters 
Construction came in and performed $4,000 worth of additional repairs to complete 
Briggs· work on the roof. Although Storms argues that these repairs were not 
"technically'· performed on the roof, both parties agree that but.for tlte problems with 
Briggs Roofing, Waters Construction would not have performed a,iy repairs on the 
building. The only reason Waters Construction ever came to the Brownstone was to 
perform repairs from Briggs Roofing's defective roof work. Clearly, Waters 
Construction's work on the building is properly categorized as a roof repair. 
The undisputed evidence at trial showed that Watkins paid Waters Construction 
$4,000 to date for the work on the roof repairs. t9 Watkins seeks a judgment against 
Storms and Burggraf for reimbursement of this amount. 
V. THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT FOR WATKINS ON COUNT 
FIVE IN THE AMOUNT OF $8.450 BECAUSE STORMS WAS UNJUSTLY 
ENRICHED AND FAILED TO PAY FOR THE UPSTAIRS STORAGE SPACE. 
A. Storms Is Liable For The Increased Rent From July 2008 Through July 
2009. 
Idaho Code Section 55-307(1) provides as follows: 
In all leases of lands or tenements, or of any interest therein from 
month to month, the landlord may, upon giving notice in writing at least 
fifteen (15) days before the expiration of the month, change the terms of 
the lease, to take effect at the expiration of the month. The notice, when 
served upon the tenant, shal.l of itself operate and be effectual to create and 
establish, as a part of the lease, the terms, rent and conditions specified in 
the notice, if the tenant shall continue to hold the premises after the 
expiration of the month. 
19 See Plaintiffs Exhibit 16. 
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Here, the evidence at trial showed that Watkins provided written notice to Storms 
that it would no longer accept $100 per month as rent for the upstairs storage space. The 
June 12, 2008 letter informed Storms that the new monthly rental amount would be 
$750. 20 Storms continued to use the upstairs storage space from July 2008 through July 
2009. Stonns continued to pay $100 per month during this time. However, as a matter of 
law, he is responsible for the difference between the increased rent of $750 and the $100 
per month that he paid. Thus, as a matter of law applied to the undisputed facts, Storms 
is liable for $650 per month for 13 months, or $8,450. 
B. In The Alternative, St01111s Has Been Unjustly Enriched By Continuing To 
Use The Upstairs Storage Space. 
"A prima facie case of unjust enrichment consists of three elements: ( 1) there was 
a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant 
of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit w1der circumstances that would be 
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the 
value thereof." Vanderf()rd Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 558 (2007) (citation 
omitted). 
Clearly, Watkins conferred a benefit on Storms by allowing him to use the 
upstairs storage space that was not part of the Lease. Storms appreciated this benefit 
because he stored dry goods and other property in the upstairs storage space, which is 
located immediately adjacent to the Brownstone restaurant. For Storms to enjoy this 
benefit without paying Watkins for the reasonable value of that space would be 
inequitable. Payment of $100 per month is not reasonable as the value to Storms. The 
comi should enter judgment against Storms for $8,450. 
20 See Plaintiffs Exhibit 26. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING BRIEF - Page 17 
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\7973\Pleadings\040 Closing Brief.doc 
191 
VI. THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT FOR WATKINS ON COUNT 
SIX IN THE AMOUNT OF $3,400 BECAUSE STORMS WAS UNJUSTLY 
ENRICHED AND FAILED TO PAY FOR THE COOLER STORAGE AT THE 
"PIPEYARD." 
"A prima facie case of unjust enrichment consists of three elements: (1) there was 
a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant 
of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be 
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the 
value thereof." Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 558 (2007) (citation 
omitted). 
There is no dispute that Storms stored a large, walk-in cooler at the "pipeyard," an 
outdoor storage area owed by Watkins and not included in the Lease, from approximately 
October 2006 through July 2009. Watkins testified Storms agreed to pay $100 per month 
for this space. Storms denies there was any agreement. However, even assuming there 
was no agreement (which this could nonetheless find), the evidence is clear that Watkins 
conferred the benefit of using the "pipeyard" storage on Storms. Storms appreciated the 
benefit by keeping his cooler there for approximately 2 ½ years. To allow Storms to 
retain the benefit without payment to Watkins would be inequitable. Watkins testified 
that another business, Floral Arts, paid $100 per month for a similar area in the 
"pipeyard." Watkins' business purpose is to rent property. Storms' testimony that 
Watkins would let him store his cooler for 2 ½ years for free is not credible in light of 
Watkins' business purpose and Storms' payments for rent on the Brownstone and the 
upstairs storage area. As such, this court should find value of Storms' storage of the 
cooler at the "pipeyard" at $100 per month for the 34 months. Accordingly, the court 
should enter judgment against Storms for $3,400. 
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VII. THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT FOR WATKINS ON COUNT 
SEVEN IN THE AMOUNT OF $6,800 BECAUSE STORMS WAS UNJUSTLY 
ENRICHED AND FAILED TO PAY FOR THE SPACE #16 STORAGE. 
"A prima facie case of unjust enrichment consists of three elements: (1) there was 
a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant 
of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be 
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the 
value thereof." Vande1ford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 558 (2007) (citation 
omitted). 
Like the upstairs storage space, the Space # 16 storage is likewise not part of the 
lease. The Lease refers to Space #16 separately from the leased premises and grants 
Storms only a right of first refusal to this area.21 While there was no evidence Storms 
ever exercised this right, the evidence did show that Storms used part of Space #16 for 
years, and all of Space # 16 since approximately October 2006, at which time Storms 
changed the locks to access this area. Storms admitted that Space # 16 is not technically 
part of the Lease, but he used it for years without paying anything for it. Watkins seeks 
$200 per month for Storms' use of this area for the 34 months from October 2006 
through July 2009, or $6,800, for the time Watkins was unable to use any portion of 





21 See 18 of Addendum Din Plaintiffs Exhibit I. 
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VIII. THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT FOR WATKINS ON COUNT 
EIGHT IN THE AMOUNT OF $21,000 BECAUSE STORMS WAS 
UNJUSTLY ENRICHED AND FAILED TO PAY FOR USE OF THE 
SIDEWALK AS AN OUTDOOR DINING AREA. 
Addendum B of the Lease states, "Tenant has permission to have an outside deck 
which will not decrease or interfere with Blue Shield and Hansen Marketing parking. 
Lessor will approve the design and size of the deck and must meet all city codes."22 
The parties dispute the meaning of the phrase "outside deck." To ensure the 
"outside deck" wouldn't interfere with Blue Shield and Hansen Marketing parking, which 
was located immediately to the north of the Brownstone, Watkins testified that the parties 
understood that Storms would construct the "outside deck" off from the second floor loft 
in the Brownstone on the north side of the building. This was the whole purpose of 
including the reference to Blue Shield and Hansen Marketing parking in the Lease in the 
first place. Storms tried to dispute this, testifying at trial that he specifically remembered 
talking to Watkins about using the sidewalk area as the "outside deck." However, upon 
cross-examination, Storms conceded that he previously testified at deposition that he 
never talked to Watkins about using the sidewalk for outdoor dining. Thus, Storms' 
testimony at trial that the parties discussed using the sidewalk as an outdoor dining area 
before they signed the Lease is not credible. 
"A prima facie case of unjust enrichment consists of three elements: (1) there was 
a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant 
of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be 
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the 
22 See ii 4 of Addendum B of Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. 
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value thereof." Vande,ford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 558 (2007) (citation 
omitted). 
The parties agree that the sidewalk is not in the city's right-of-way, but is private 
property owned by Watkins. Watkins testified that the "outside deck" is a wooden 
structure built up off the ground off the north side of the second floor loft of the 
Brownstone. St01ms testified that an "outside deck" was any area customers could sit. 
Again, "In construing a written instrument, this Court must consider it as a whole 
and give meaning to all provisions of the writing to the extent possible." Selkirk Seed Co. 
v. State Ins. Fund, 135 Idaho 434, 437 (2000). Further, "as between two permissible 
constructions, that which establishes a valid contract is preferred to one which does not, 
since it is reasonable to suppose that the parties meant something by their agreement, and 
were not engaged in an attempt to do a vain and meaningless thing.,, A1organ v. 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506,519 (1948). In this regard, Storms' 
interpretation is not reasonable because it does not account for the language requiring 
Watkins' approval of the design and size of the deck, or the language referring to the area 
by the Blue Shield and Hansen Marketing parking. Storms' interpretation renders the 
Lease language "vain and meaningless." Morgan, supra. 
Even if "outside deck" included the sidewalk area as Storms proposes, the 
undisputed evidence at trial established that Storms never submitted any plans for 
Watkins' approval. Watkins should have the right to enforce the Lease. Storms would 
argue that Watkins knew of the sidewalk dining and thus acquiesced to the use. 
However, Watkins is not estopped from enforcing the Lease as written unless Storms' 
reliance on Watkins' silence would create a "substantial economic detriment." Grover v. 
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Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60, 64 (2009). Here, Storms provided no evidence of a 
"substantial economic detriment" that would result if he had to comply with the lease 
terms he agreed to in the first place. 
Had Storms submitted plans and obtained Watkins's approval for a deck, and then 
built the deck according to the approved specifications, Watkins would have no right to 
additional payment. l-Iowever, because Storms chose to ignore the Lease requirements 
regarding the outside deck and instead simply started using the sidewalk area for outdoor 
dining, to allow him to use Watkins' sidewalk area without payment would be 
inequitable. Watkins seeks $500 per month for the use of this sidewalk area during the 
seven summer months of April to October each year from 2004 through 2009, for a total 
of $21,000. 
IX. THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT FOR WATKINS ON COUNT 
NINE AND EVICT STORMS AND BURGGRAF FROM THE PREMISES 
AND THE SIDEWALK AREA. 
Paragraph 22 of the Lease providing Watkins' remedies upon the lessees' default 
states, "Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to limit any other rights or remedies 
which Lessor may have." 
Idaho Code Section 6-303, et seq., provides for the remedy of eviction. If a tenant 
fails to pay rent, the landlord is entitled to restitution of the premises. Brooks v. 
Coppedge, 71 Idaho 166, 170 (1951). In such a case, the lease is not terminated until 
after entry of a judgment to that effect. Id. 71 Idaho at 171. 
Clearly, Storms and Burggraf have materially breached the Lease. As such, 
Watkins has the legal right to an order evicting Storms and Burggraf from the property. 
Because Storms and Burggraf have no right to possession of the sidewalk area, the order 
to evict Storms and Burggraf should include the sidewalk as well. 
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Watkins testified at trial that it wished things were different and that it doesn't 
want to put anybody out of business, but Watkins cannot continue its relationship with 
Storms under the present circumstances. Clearly, Watkins has the right to an eviction 
order. 
X. THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT FOR WATKINS ON COUNT 
TEN BECAUSE STORMS FAILED TO PAY THE FOOD AND DRINK 
CREDIT. 
Addenda A and D of the Lease provide that Watkins shall receive a $250 per 
month food and drink credit from Storms and Burggraf. However, the parties agreed that 
they did not handle the food and drink credit as writlen in the Lease. Rather, Storms 
provided Watkins with 12 months of food and drink credit in December of each year in 
the total annual amount of $3,000. Then Watkins had 12 months before the credit would 
expire. Both Watkins and Storms agreed that Storms and Burggraf had not provided the 
credit since December 2007, which credits expired in December 2008. This credit is 
based on the $250 per month value to Watkins, not the actual cost to Storms and 
Burggraf. As such, Storms and Burggraf owe a $3,000 credit from December 2008, and 
another $3,000 credit from December 2009, for a total of $6,000. 
XI. DEFENDANTS' AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES DO NOT CHANGE THE 
RESULT OF THE JUDGMENT SOUGHT IN THIS CASE. 
In their amended answer to amended complaint, Storms and Burggraf raise a 
number of affirmative defenses.23 However, none of these affirmative defenses alter the 
judgment that Watkins seeks in this case. 
As to their First Affirmative Defense, Storms and Burggraf failed to present any 
evidence that Watkins has failed to mitigate its damages. 
23 See pp. 2-3 of Defendants' Amended Answer to Plaintifrs Amended Complaint dated November 17, 
2009, already on file with the cotni. 
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As to their Second Affirmative Defense, the court previously ruled at summary 
judgment that the five-year statute of limitations applied to Watkins' claims in this action. 
However, Watkins conformed its evidence at trial to the court's ruling and does not seek 
damages accruing before November 2003. As such, this defense does not affect the 
judgment Watkins seeks herein. 
As to their Third Affirmative Defense, Storms and Burggraf presented no 
evidence to justify application of the doctrine oflaches. The Idaho Supreme Court 
explained the doctrine of laches as follows: 
The defense of laches is a creation of equity and is a specie of 
equitable estoppel. Whether a party is guilty of laches primarily is a 
question of fact and therefore its determination is within the province of 
the trial court. The decision to apply laches is committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Because application of laches is discretionary, 
the standard of review on appeal is whether the trial court properly found 
( l) a lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted, 
and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense. As a corollary, the 
denial of a defense of laches by the trial court will be upheld in the 
absence of an abuse of discretion. 
Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 249 (2004) ( citation omitted). Here, Storms and 
Burggraf presented no evidence of a lack of diligence by Watkins in prosecuting its 
claims other than the application of the statute of limitations, which has already been 
applied. More importantly, Storms and Burggraf presented no evidence of any prejudice 
to them resulting from the timing of Watkins' claims. As such, this affirmative defense 
does not affect the judgment Watkins seeks. 
As to their Fourth Affirmative Defense, although temporarily raised as a defense 
at summary judgment, Storms and Burggraf abandoned their defense of contract 
modification by course of conduct. The court previously noted this abandonment.24 
24 See p. 2 of the Order dated January 20, 2010, already on file with the court. 
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As for their Fifth Affirmative Defense, Watkins discussed accord and satisfaction 
above and explained why Storms and Burggraf do not prevail on this defense. 
As for their Sixth Affirmative Defense, Storms and Burggraf presented no 
evidence to support the doctrine of resjudicata against any of Watkins' claims. 
Apparently, Storms and Burggraf intended to assert this defense against Watkins' claim 
for roof repair damages. However, Storms and Burggraf presented no evidence of an 
action between Watkins and Storms on Watkins' present claim for roofrepairs. See 
Kootenai Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Lamar Corp., 148 Idaho 116, --- (2009). The only 
evidence tangentially related to resjudicata involved Waters Construction's lawsuit 
against Stonns and Watkins for payment for Waters' work. There was no evidence that 
the Waters lawsuit involved any claim by Watkins against Storms that resulted in a final 
judgment. As such, resjudicata does not affect the judgment Watkins seeks herein. 
As for any other defenses Storms and Burggraf may raise in their closing brief, 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) provides that certain, enumerated defenses shall be 
made by motion. Otherwise, "Eve,y defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall be 
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required ... " I.R.C.P. 12(b) 
( emphasis added). Storms and Burggraf cannot at this late stage raise any other 
affirmative defense not previously plead. 
XII. CONCLUSION. 
Based on the foregoing, the court should enter a money judgment for Watkins 
against Storms in the amount of $1,086,138, itemized as follows: 
Percentage Rent ............................................. $21,888 
Late Fees .......................................................... $7, 100 
Food & Drink Credit ........................................ $6,000 
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Roof Repairs .................................................... $4,000 
Accelerated Rent ....................................... $1,007,500 
Upstairs Storage ............................................... $8,450 
"Pipeyard" Storage ........................................... $3,400 
Space #16 Storage ............................................ $6,800 
Outdoor Dining .............................................. $21,000 
TOTAL $1,086,138 
Fmiher, the court should enter a money judgment for Watkins against Burggraf in 
the amount of $1,046,488, itemized as follows: 
Percentage Rent ............................................. $21,888 
Late Fees .......................................................... $7,100 
Food & Drink Credit.. ...................................... $6,000 
Roof Repairs .................................................... $4,000 
Accelerated Rent ....................................... $1,007,500 
TOTAL $1,046,488 
Additionally, the court should enter a judgment in favor of Watkins ordering 
Storms and Burggraf evicted from the premises and restoring possession of the leased 
premises to Watkins. This order should also prohibit Storms from continuing to use 
Watkins' sidewalk for outdoor dining purposes. 
In the event the court does not enter a judgment for restitution of the premises and 
the defendants otherwise retain possession of the premises, the comi should enter an 
order requiring Storms and Burggraf to specifically perform their contractual duty to 
provide Watkins with the monthly sales for the previously month "by the 10th of each 
month" pursuant to Addendum A of the Lease. Further, the court should enter a 
judgment requiring Storms and Burggraf and to provide Watkins with a power of 
attorney acceptable to the Idaho State Tax Commission to allow Watkins "to check sales 
figures" submitted by Storms and Burggraf for the business operated on the lease 
premises. 
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Watkins reserves the right to raise the post-judgment issues of pre-judgment 
interest, post-judgment interest, costs, and attorney's fees until such time as the comi 
enters its judgment herein. 
DATED this ~ day of February, 2010. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES PLLC 
By 
' ,/cL# ~ J Driscoll 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ;)c2_ day of February, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING BRIEF to be served, by 
placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the 
following: 
Michael J. Whyte, Esq. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW 
OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUD\<;:,IAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COU1\JT\UOFltt:lNjNlp'7,l1:s-f 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV-08-7258 
V. ORDER ON SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING 
MICHAEL STORMS and KA THY 
BURGGRAF, 
Defendants. 
In the course of the bench trial in this matter, the Court requested supplemental 
briefing on Plaintiff's claim for accelerated rent based upon an alleged breach of the 
Lease Agreement. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court allowed the Paiiies until 
February 22, 2010 to submit briefing on this issue. The Court received the Paiiies' 
supplemental briefing although Plaintiff's brief was not limited to the foregoing issue. 
Defendants have accordingly requested leave to supplement its brief to address all issues. 
A hearing on this matter is not necessary. 
The record is not clear that supplemental briefing was to be limited to the 
accelerated rent issue, although that was the Court's anticipation. Accordingly, 
Defendants' motion is granted. Defendants shall have ten days to supplement its brief to 
include briefing on all issues. 
Dated this _2:_ 1....,( day of February, 2010. 
ORDER ON SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING(., ,. n 
'u ,(,, 
1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this sztiday of February, 2010, I did send a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the 
correct postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse 
mailbox: or by causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
BJ. Driscoll 
SMTTH DRISCOLL & 
ASSOC TA TES. PLLC 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls. ID 83405 
Michael J. Whyte 
THOMSEN STEPHENS 
LAW OFFICES. PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
ORDER ON SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, ldaho 
By )1~ --~~----~ -~---
Deputy Clerk 
n. 'J /., u ... 2 
Michael J. Whyte, Esq., ISB #4645 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls ID 83404 
Telephone (208)522-1230 
Fax (208)522-1277 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BUNJ\IEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMP ANY, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 














Case No. CV-08-7258 
SUPPLEMENTAL CLOSING BRIEF 
COMES NOW Defendants, by and through their attorney or record, and submits this 
Supplemental Closing Brief. 
I. COUNT ONE 
BREACH OF WRITTEN LEASE CONTRACT - FAIL URE TO PAY AMOUNTS DUE 
In Count One, Plaintiff seeks additional rent based on the gross sales from the 
Brownstone restaurant. There is no dispute that as of the date of trial, defendants had paid all the 
base rent under the lease agreement. As was born out through pretrial motions, and the trial 
testimony, defendant did not believe that he was required to pay any additional amount based on 
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the Brownstone's gross sales beginning in 2007. However, approximately one month prior to the 
trial the Court ruled that this clause stating that the amount of the base rent could be increased up 
to 5% of the gross sales applies the entire term of the contract. Plaintiffs originally sought 
$28,988.00 in their complaint. Through the testimony and Exhibit 34 it was clear that defendants 
had paid some additional rent to be applied toward this percentage rent. The Plaintiff agreed 
these additional amounts should be applied with the exception of an additional $967.00 as 
evidence by defendants' Exhibits I and J. Exhibit I shows the base rent owed for September of 
2007 in the amount of $2,683.00, and actual payment of $3,258.00. Exhibit J shows an is 
defendants' check stub indicating an additional $392.00 was paid to plaintiff. The notation on 
the check stub indicated the payment was for "rent." Plaintiff argues this additional amount was 
for unpaid property taxes. However, plaintiff further testified property taxes for that year would 
have been due in June. Plaintiff did not provide other evidence or documentation supporting 
plaintiff's "belief' that the additional $967.00 paid by defendants was for property taxes which 
would have been due several months earlier. The only clear undisputed evidence comes from 
defendant Storms' testimony and Exhibits I and J. Therefor this additional amount should apply 
as a credit for defendants. 
Plaintiff wants the Court to find his testimony and believe as more accurate because of his 
claim that defendants never paid the percentage of rent due. However, in reviewing Exhibit 34 it 
is clear that Defendants paid some amount for percentage rent more often than not. Exhibit 34 
shows a total of 76 months. Of those, there were 30 months wherein additional rent was owed 
based on the Brownstone sales proceeds. Exhibit 34 further shows that defendants paid 
additional rent to Plaintiff in 26 months. Although the amount paid was not all that was owed to 
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plaintiff under this exhibit, it is clearly not true that defendants never paid any portion of this 
additional rent. 
The amounts sought by plaintiff should further be offset by the accord and satisfaction 
reached by the parties in September of 2008. Exhibits_ f~ and Jj_ are two separate Three Day 
Notice to Pay Rent or Quit the Premises prepared by plaintiff and delivered on defendants. At 
the time they were created, plaintiff had already made demand on defendant for payment of 
numerous items as outlined in a June 2008 letter (Exhibit 26). Plaintiff testified that he was 
aware of the demands made in the June letter. Plaintiff further testified that he was aware that 
there was no language in the exhibits outlining the underlying basis for the amount sought and 
that the language of Exhibits 1!__ and~ stated that if defendant paid the amounts requested that 
he would be in compliance with the lease. Defendant Storms also testified that he was aware 
plaintiff was seeking amount for unpaid rent and other claims through Exhibit 26 at the time he 
was served with Exhibit I_[ and j_J_. With this information, he paid the amounts plaintiff sought 
in order to remove the question of his compliance with the lease and to take advantage of 
plaintiffs offered compromise. Idaho Code §28-3-310 addresses what is necessary for an accord 
and satisfaction. This statute states: 
(1) If a person against whom a claim is asserted proves that (I) that person in 
good faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full satisfaction of the claim, 
(ii) the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute, and 
(iii) the claimant obtained payment of the instrument, the following subsections 
apply. 
(2) Unless subsection (3) of this section applies, the claim is discharged if the 
person against whom the claim is asserted proves that the instrument or an 
accompanying written communication contained a conspicuous statement to the 
effect that the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the claim. 
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Idaho Code §28-3-310. 
Plaintiff created the written communication offering a compromise of a disputed claim 
with defendants. The three-day notices clearly state an amount plaintiff would accept from 
defendants in order for defendants to be in compliance with the lease. The simple definition of 
compliance is to be in conformity with the requirements. In this case, in conformity with the 
requirements under the lease and the other issues outlined in Exhibit 26. Plaintiff did not offer 
another definition of "compliance" in the Notices. The conspicuous language in the Notices, 
created by plaintiff, was accepted by defendants when payment was made. There was no 
language restricting this offer of compromise except for the length of time the offer was open. 
When defendant made this payment within the time specified, an accord and satisfaction took 
place. "To establish an accord and satisfaction the parties accepting a new or different obligation 
must do so knowingly and intentionally". Harris v. Wildcat Corp.,97 Idaho 884, 886, 556 P.2d 
67, 69 (1976). However, "an accord and satisfaction may be implied from the attendant 
circumstances". Id. 
Plaintiff testified that these Notices could not cover any other issue or payment other than 
rent because the statute only allows a claim for unpaid rent. However, this is not accurate. Idaho 
Code § 6-303(2) outlines the process where a landlord can issue a written three day notice to a 
tenant when the tenant is in default of paying the rent. Idaho Code§ 6-303(3) allows the same 
recourse for a landlord when the tenant has failed to perform other conditions of the lease or 
agreement under which the property is held other than a payment for rent. The statute further 
allows that if the tenant pays the amount within three days the lease is saved from forfeiture. 
Where a lease agreement contains a definitive contractual right to terminate the lease upon 
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default of the lessee, the lessor has a choice of pursuing either its contractual or statutory remedy. 
Riverside Development Company v. Ritchie, 103 ID 515,650 P.2d 657 (1982). Plaintiff was 
aware of the amounts sought prior to the Notices, including additional monies for the following: 
additional rent; roof repairs; use of the upstairs storage unit; storage of a cooler; use of "space 
#16"; use of the outdoor sidewalk area; and food and drink gift cards. Defendant relied to his 
detriment on these Three Day Notices and acted on plaintiffs statements regarding the amounts 
which plaintiff was seeking and that if those amounts were paid defendants would be in 
compliance with the lease. 
If the Notices do not include anything other than rent, than at a minimum, defendant was 
in compliance with the amount of rent owed as of September 2008. Plaintiff testified that he did 
not include any language into the Notices to qualify the "rent" sought. The lease defines rent as 
either the base rent or a percentage of gross sales. Both plaintiff and defendant knew this at the 
time of the Notices. The language of the Notices is not ambiguous and the logical interpretation 
to apply is that the "rent" sought in the Notices was both base rent and percentage rent. Plaintiff 
should not now be allowed to add a definition. Therefore, plaintiff offered a compromise to 
defendant that was accepted by defendant and as of September 2008 defendant was in 
compliance with the lease. 
II. 
LATE FEES 
Plaintiff made a claim for additional late fees because defendants failed to timely pay 
rent. Both plaintiff and defendant testified that the lease, Exhibit 1, does not contain an actual 
date when the rent is due. Plaintiff tried to propound that "normal" lease would be due on the 
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first; however continued to admit that this particular lease has no specific day of the month when 
the lease is due. No proof or evidence was provided that the lease was due on the first as plaintiff 
claims. All witnesses testified that the course of conduct throughout the entire lease tenn (since 
1997) was to pay the rent after the City of Idaho Falls furnished the utility statement. The 
evidence showed that defendants paid the rent upon receipt of the utility statement so that a 
subtraction of plaintiffs share of the utilities could be made. "Unless otherwise agreed, periodic 
rent is payable the beginning of any term of one month or less and otherwise in equal monthly 
installments at the beginning of each month." (Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act§ 
1.401 (c).) "The rent is due on the date either expressly made or to be gathered by necessary 
implication from the acts and circumstances of the parties or by custom or usage in the 
community." 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant§ 555. Because the commercial lease lacks a 
specific due date, the historical practice controls when the rent is due. The evidence showed that 
the agreement of the parties and the acts and circumstances of the parties was to pay the rent after 
the utility statement was received. 
If, on the other hand, the Court detem1ines that the first day of the month was the 
intended date when rent was due, then the parties actually modified the lease through their course 
of conduct for the first 12 years by waiting until the utility statement was received from the City. 
"Consent to a modification of a prior written contract may be implied from a course of conduct 
consistent with the asserted modification. Ore-Ida Potato Products, Inc. v. Larsen, supra at 296, 
362 P.2d 384. 
Under either situation, plaintiff failed to prove it's claim that the defendant paid rent late 
which would trigger the late fees charge. 
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III. 
COUNT TWO 
BREACH OF WRITTEN LEASE CONTRACT - ACCELERATION 
Defendants, previously provided their argument regarding the acceleration of lease clause 
and therefor will not provide any additional argument. 
IV. COUNT THREE 
BREACH OF WRITTEN LEASE CONTRACT - FAIL URE TO PROVIDE MONTHLY 
SALES REPORTS 
At the trial defendants confinned that they did not supply the monthly sales reports to 
Plaintiff. However, Addendum "A" to the lease stated that the lease was a power of attorney to 
allow plaintiff to obtain the sales reports from the State of Idaho. Plaintiff testified that he used 
the lease to obtain sales reports prior to filing the lawsuit. Defendants further testified that 
plaintiff never asked for the sales reports. Therefore the logical presumptions was that the 
plaintiff was obtaining those reports from the State of Idaho. The purpose of the power of 
attorney was for plaintiff to obtain the reports. Although defendants did not provide the reports, 
plaintiff was obtaining the reports thereby accomplishing the same effect. 
V. COUNTFOUR 
BREACH OF WRITTEN LEASE CONTRACT- FAILURE TO PAY ROOF REPAIRS 
Plaintiffs amended complaint sought payment of $4, 500.00 as payment for roof repairs. 
A. Defendants paid the full amount for the roof repairs. 
Plaintiff testified that defendant Storms paid $5,000.00 on December 23, 2005 and an 
additional $500.00 on June 21, 2007 to plaintiff for the roof repairs. The history showed that 
although defendant paid the $5,000.00 in 2005, plaintiff failed to pay the roof company until 
June 22, 2007. During that period of time, plaintiff held defendants money and failed to pay his 
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obligation to the roofing company. Regardless, in June 2007 Briggs Roofing accepted $5,500.00 
as payment for its services in fixing the roof. Testimony provided by all parties confirm that this 
was the amount paid to plaintiff by defendant Stonns. 
Plaintiffs amended complaint sought $4,500.00 for these repairs; however by the time 
the matter went to trial the amount sought was $4,000.00. Under defendants' standing objection, 
plaintiff testified that the additional $4,000.00 sought in this claim was not for roof repairs, but 
was actually for walls and ceiling repairs. This was contrary to plaintiffs claim in its complaint. 
Plaintiff wants to piggy-back these damages into it's roof repair claim; however, as indicated 
through the testimony, all roof repairs were paid by Stonns and no additional amount for roof 
repairs is owing to plaintiff or any third party. 
B. Defendants paid their percentage under the lease agreement. 
If it is determined that not all amounts of the roofrepairs have been paid, defendants still 
do not owe any additional amounts because defendants paid their portion under the lease 
agreement. Addendum "B" to the lease only states that the maintenance and repairs of the roof 
as "T %". Because this term is ambiguous, it is up to the trier of fact to determine the intent of 
the parties by considering the objective and purpose of the provision and the circumstances 
surrounding the formation of the agreement. State v. Alan, 143 Id.267, 272 (Ct. App. 2006). The 
parties have differing interpretations for this term. Plaintiff testified that the T¾ referred to the 
entire area covering the Brownstone Restaurant. Plaintiff did not testify that this interpretation 
was actually discussed with defendants at the time the lease was entered into. However, both 
Defendants testified that when they created the lease with plaintiff, the roof repair issue was 
discussed and agreed that defendants would be responsible for only a percentage of the roof 
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covering the Brownstone Restaurant. Storms further testified that in his prior written lease with 
Watkins when he and other family members were operating the business known as the "Quilted 
Bear", there was similar language in that lease and a similar agreement that both plaintiff and 
Storms were each responsible for a portion of the roof covering that Quilted Bear business. 
Prior to the roof issues which are the subject of this litigation, there were no other 
maintenance or repairs to the roof to provide guidance as to this interpretation. Plaintiff wants to 
defendants to be 100% responsible for all roofrepairs. However, the acts of the parties with 
respect to these repairs suggests otherwise. Plaintiff testified that he chose and contracted with 
Briggs Roofing to provide the repairs. Storms testified that he had no discussion or input with 
plaintiff about who to hire for these repairs and was unaware that plaintiff had hired Briggs to 
perform any roofrepairs until Briggs' workers began working. Storms testified that no repair 
bills were sent to him and he was only aware of the costs incurred when plaintiff would request 
money from Storms. Plaintiff and Storms both testified that all of defendants' payments were 
paid to plaintiff and that plaintiff held defendant's money for these repairs. When a final 
settlement and compromise was reached in June 2007, and Storms agreed to pay an additional 
$500.00 to have this matter resolved, again the final settlement payment was made to plaintiff 
instead of paying Briggs Roofing directly. All of these actions are inconsistent with plaintiffs 
position that he has no responsibility for any roof repairs. Plaintiff wants to claim no 
responsibility for these roof repairs; however, Plaintiff controlled all circumstances involved with 
the roof repairs after Storms advised him of the leaks: Plaintiff controlled the negotiations and 
contract with the company hired to do the work; plaintiff received the billing statements for 
repairs; plaintiff did not provide much, if any cost information to defendant while the repairs 
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were being conducted; plaintiff required defendant to pay him instead of the repair company 
directly; plaintiff retained defendants' money during the repairs instead of paying the repair 
company or returning it to defendants; plaintiff eventually negotiated a settlement with the roof 
company and paid the roof company that settlement amount. At no time did plaintiff tum any of 
this responsibility over to defendants. If plaintiff truly had no responsibility for this roof and the 
roof repairs, the more logical course of action would be for plaintiff to have no involvement with 
this process and require defendant to hire the repair company, control the repair company's scope 
of work, and pay the repair company directly. Because the exact opposite took place in that 
Plaintiff controlled all aspects of this repair, it is more logical that Plaintiff has responsibility for 
this roof and believed that at the time of these repairs, had responsibility for the payment of these 
roof costs. In light of the circumstances and events surrounding the roof repair, the logical 
interpretation this "T¾" language is to hold that plaintiff has equal responsibility for the roof 
repair costs, that defendants have paid their share and that plaintiff should not recover for the 
amount sought in his complaint. 
If the interpretation of the language and the intent of the parties remains in doubt then the 
language should be interpreted against the drafter of the document - plaintiff. 
However, where the parties' mutual intent cannot be understood from the language 
used, intent becomes a question for the trier of fact, to be ascertained in light of 
extrinsic evidence. Luzar, 107 Idaho at 697, 692 P.2d at 341; USA Fertilizer, 120 
Idaho at 273, 815 P .2d at 4 71. If, after applying the ordinary processes of 
interpretation and considering the relevant extrinsic evidence, there remains doubt 
as to the actual, mutual intent of the parties, then the ambiguity should be resolved 
against the party who used the ambiguity in drafting the contract. Luzar, 107 
Idaho at 697, 692 P.2d at 341; Werry v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 97 Idaho 130, 540 
P.2d 792 (1975); Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Grasmick, 91 Idaho 6,415 P.2d 48 
(1966); USA Fertilizer, 120 Idaho at 274,815 P.2d at 472; see also 3 CORBIN 
ON CONTRACTS § 559 (1960). 
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Farnsworth v. Dairymen's Creamery Ass 'n, 125 Idaho 866, 870, 876 P .2d 148, 152 (Ct. App. 
1994). 
Because plaintiff was the drafter of this lease any ambiguity remaining should be resolved 
against plaintiff and therefore the plaintiff has equal responsibility for the maintenance and 
repairs of this roof. 
C. Accord and Satisfaction. 
In the alternative, defendants have further paid all amounts for the roof repairs through 
the accord and satisfaction reached by the parties in September 2008. At the time of the three 
day notices, the roof repairs were completed. Plaintiff had made demand that defendant pay the 
repair costs in Exhibit 26. Idaho Code §6-303(3) allows a landlord to serve a three day notice of 
eviction when a tenant has failed to perform conditions of the lease or agreement, other than 
payment of the rent. The roofrepairs are part of the lease, but not included in the rent. Under 
Idaho Code §6-303(3) plaintiff issued its three day notice to defendant which included a 
compromise of the roof repair claims. 
Additionally, Storms testified that this lease was not created by himself nor Kathy 
Burggraf. It was presented by Plaintiff. Therefor the presumption is the Plaintiff created this 
document. Because Plaintiff created this document, the interpretation should be in favor of 
Defendant and against Plaintiff. 
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VI. COUNT FIVE 
BREACH OF THE ORAL LEASE CONTRACT BASED ON THE ARRANGEMENT OF 
THE UPSTAIRS STORAGE 
Plaintiff testified that the parties never had a agreement to rent the upstairs for $100.00 
per month. However, this is contrary to the June 2008 letter (Exhibit 26) sent by plaintiffs 
attorneys at plaintiffs direction, using plaintiffs infonnation, which specifically stated the 
parties had an agreement to rent the upstairs for $100. 00 per month. Defendants continued to 
pay, and plaintiff continued to accept the agreed upon $100.00 per month until such time as the 
Court ended the tenancy of defendant. Defendant paid all amounts owing under this agreement 
and therefor no additional amounts are due and owing. 
Plaintiffs are not entitled to any additional rent for the upstairs based on the claim of 
unjust enrichment. "A prima facie case of unjust enrichment consists of three elements: (1) There 
was a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation of such benefits; 
and (3) acceptance of the benefit under the circumstances that would be inequitable for the 
Defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the Plaintiff for value thereof" Vanderford 
Co., Inc., v. Knudson, 144 Id. 547, 558 (2007) (emphasis added). There is no dispute that 
defendants occupied this space by agreement of the parties. There is further no dispute that 
plaintiffs receive payment of $100.00 per month from defendants for the use of this space. This 
is the appropriate and accepted value of this space. Plaintiff was unable to prove the third 
element of unjust enrichment in that defendants paid plaintiff for the value of the benefit. 
Historically, the value of the property was $100.00 as agreed by the parties. Plaintiff did not 
provide any evidence as to a value other than this $100.00 paid and accepted. Defendant was 
unaware of the actual size of this property and could not testify as to its value. Plaintiff claims 
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that $750.00 requested in Exhibit 26 is the actual value of the use of this property; however, this 
has no independent verification or proof for this amount and said amount cannot be the actual 
value when viewed in terms of the space and the lease overall. Both parties confirm that space 
was used for storage and that the only access to this property is through the Brownstone kitchen 
up a narrow stairway. In comparison to the rent paid for the Brownstone space, the $750.00 
demanded for this storage space is an extremely over exaggerated value. There is no dispute that 
the parties agreed the reasonable value for this space was $100.00 prior to this lawsuit. In 
November 2007 there was a $625.00 increase in the base rent for the entire are occupied by the 
Brownstone Restaurant including the kitchen, seating area, and office of approximately 5,000 sq. 
ft. This equates to approximately 14% increase in base rent. On the other hand, Plaintiff seeks 
an unreasonable $650.00 increase for small storage area which equates to more than a 700% 
increase in claimed value. The reasonable value of the space is and was $100.00 and plaintiff 
received this value for use of the space. 
VII. COUNT SIX 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT - COOLER STORAGE 
It was agreed that Storms stored a walk-in cooler at plaintiffs "pipeyard" from 
approximately October 2006 though July 2009. Defendant testified parties had no agreement for 
payment for the use of the space, and plaintiff allowed defendant use of the space without 
demanding payment until 2008. Therefore, the court should hold that the parties was to allow 
Storms to store this as a gratuity given the previous business relationship. 
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VIII. COUNT SEVEN 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT - SPACE NO. 16 STORAGE 
Plaintiff again seeks an unjust enrichment claim for the use of Space 1 6. In the amended 
complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants had been using Space 16 for approximately 34 
months as of the day of the amended complaint (August 5, 2009). Trial testimony confirmed that 
both plaintiff and defendant were using this storage area. No testimony was provided with 
respect to the area of Space 1 6 nor the corresponding reasonable value of this space. Defendants 
testified that the use of this Space was to be without compensation to plaintiff and according to 
Exhibit 26, as of June 12, 2008, plaintiff also believed that defendant use of this space was a 
courtesy, and that no rent was expected. It is clear that at that time, no rent was historically 
expected and plaintiff can not now make a claim that rent is due for the use of this space. 
Additionally, as with the upstairs space, plaintiff was unable to establish a value in order to 
satisfy the elements of unjust enrichment. 
IX. COUNT EIGHT 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT - OUTDOOR DINNING AREA USE 
The trial testimony was that the lease contains language in Addendum B allowing the use 
of outdoor space by defendants: 
4. Tenant has permission to have an outside deck which will 
not decrease or interfere with Blue Shield and Hansen Marketing 
parking. Lessor will approve the design and size of the deck and 
must meet all city codes. 
For several years, during the warmer months, in accordance with the lease, without comment, 
objection or complaint from plaintiff, defendants used an area outside the main entrance of the 
restaurant to serve Brownstone customers. This area does not interfere with Blue Shield and 
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Hansen Marketing parking. All parties provided their testimony regarding this clause in the lease 
agreement. Both defendants testified that the use of the sidewalk was included in the definition 
of "deck" in that all parties discussed using multiple places, including the sidewalk in front of the 
restaurant. Plaintiff wants to narrow the use of the sidewalk space because he believes that a 
"deck" is only a structure made from wood. However the general definition of "deck" includes a 
flat floored roofless area adjoining a building. Therefore the use of the sidewalk is within the 
scope of Addendum Band would be included in a reasonable definition of that clause. 
If the interpretation of the parties' intent when it chose the term "deck" remains in doubt 
and ambiguous, then this ambiguity should be resolved against the plaintiff as the drafter of the 
lease. Farnsworth 125 Idaho at 870. 
In the alternative, if the use of the sidewalk is not included in the definition of "deck", plaintiff is 
still not entitled to additional compensation for this space because he is already receiving 
compensation through the rent payments. Both plaintiff and defendant testified that the use of 
the outside area allows defendant to serve more customers and to increase its monthly gross 
sales. Under the rental payment clause, the defendant pays more in rent when its revenues 
increase. Because the use of the outside area increases the sales and there is a corresponding 
increase in the rent, plaintiff has already received compensation for the use of the outdoor space. 
COUNT NINE 
FOOD AND DRINK CREDIT 
The addenda allows Watkins to receive $250.00 per month food and drink credit. 
However, the testimony was that prior to 2007, defendants would provide a complete years worth 
of food credit ($3,000.00) to plaintiff to his before the next calendar year expired. Plaintiff wants 
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to claim that in the parties modified the lease so that the entire years worth of food credit should 
be paid instead of paying each month. However, in other circumstances when the parties have 
not complied with the specific language of the lease, including, but not limited to the specific 
date when rent was due, plaintiff does not want the parties historical actions and application to 
have any influence or control on the lease language. If the Court determines that Plaintiff is 
entitled to food and drink credit, parties should be order to comply with the terms of the lease and 
have those amounts turned over on a monthly basis in the amount of $250.00. 
X. COUNTTEN 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE - LA CHES 
Plaintiff testified that he was damaged under all counts, and had been so damaged for 
numerous years prior to bringing a lawsuit. The doctrine of lac hes is defined as neglect to assert 
a right or claim which taken together with a lapse of time when other circumstances causes 
prejudice to the adverse party it should operate as a bar in a court of equity. Wooded Shores 
Property Owners Association, Inc. v. A1atthews, 37 Ill.App.3d. 334,345 N.E. 2d.186,189. Both 
parties testified that they had operated under this lease for approximately 11 years before this 
lawsuit was filed. The testimony further indicated that the parties operation under this lease, as 
well as defendants use of the upstairs, Space 16 and sidewalk space and the payment of the base 
rent without providing specific information on the sales proceeds throughout the course of the 
lease, continued without complaint or attempt by plaintiff to remedy until shortly before this 
lawsuit. With respect to the percentage of rent, because plaintiff did not request defendant's sale 
proceeds nor any additional rent based on the sales until shortly before this lawsuit was filed, 
defendant detrimentally relied on plaintiffs inaction that this portion of the lease did not apply. 
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Similarly, plaintiff did not request defendant to discontinue use of the sidewalk area, space 16, 
the upstairs space and the use of the pipeyard until shortly before this lawsuit began. Defendant 
again reasonable relied on plaintiffs silence and inaction for numerous years and acted under the 
belief that he was in compliance. Plaintiff should be barred from all claims wherein the evidence 
showed that he allowed activity to continue to the point where defendant believed he was 
compliant and his activities were accepted and within the interpretation of the contract. 
DATED this 5th day of March, 2010. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and 
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the 5th day of March, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL CLOSING BRIEF to be served upon the 
following persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the 
United States mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by 
facsimile as set forth below. 
BRYAND SMITH ESQ 
BJ DRISCOLL ESQ 
PO BOX 50731 
IDAHO FALLS ID 83405-0731 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
MJW:thl 
J:\data\MJW\6753\PLEADINGS\032 Sup Cl Brf.wpd 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONl\JEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company. 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MICHAEL STORMS and KA THY 
BURGGRAF. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-7258 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
This matter was before the Court on a Court trial on February 9. 2010. The Cou1i 
having considered the evidence makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiff The Watkins Company. LLC owns commercial real estate located at 455 
River Parkway, Idaho Falls. Idaho (the Property). Dane Watkins, Sr. is Plaintiffs 
managing partner. On July 31, 1996, Defendants Michael Storms and Kathy Burggraf 
entered into a commercial lease agreement (the Lease) with Plaintiff to lease the 
Property. 
The term of the Lease began on November 1, 1997, and is scheduled to end on 
October 31, 2027, for a total term of30 years, subject to two potential ten-year extensions 
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at Defendants' option. Defendants operated a microbrewery and restaurant on the 
Property which restaurant was known as the Brownstone. Burggraf ceased active 
involvement in managing the Brov-.11stone in 2002 and Storms purchased her interest in 
2005. Storms continues to operate the Brownstone on the Property. 
Except during the initial months of the Lease covered by prepaid rent, the Lease 
requires Defendants to pay either a fixed base rent or five-percent of the Brownstone's 
gross sales, whichever is greater. 
The Lease does not specify on which day of the month rent is due. Historically, 
Defendants have paid rent around the tenth of the month, after receiving the 
Brownstone's utility bill and deducting Plaintiffs portion of the utilities from the rent 
payment. 
Since November 2003, Defendants have failed to pay $20,965.00 1 in rent for the 
months where the percentage rent exceeded the base rent. 
Addendum A to the Lease requires Defendants to provide the Brownstone's 
monthly sales figures to Plaintiff by the tenth of each month. Addendum A to the Lease 
also grants Plaintiff a power of attorney to obtain the monthly sales figures from the 
Idaho State Tax Commission. Storms never provided Plaintiff with the Brownstone's 
monthly sales figures and effectively revoked the power of attorney granted in the Lease 
by instructing the Tax Commission to not provide any information to Plaintiff. 
Under the Lease, Plaintiff is entitled to a $250 per month food and drink credit. 
Although not spelled out in the Lease, Defendants have historically provided Plaintiff 
1 Plaintiff claims the amount due for unpaid rent is $21,888.00. However, Storms presented evidence at 
trial that he overpaid rent in August and September 2007 in the amount of $923.00, which he was not given 
credit for. Storms provided check stubs stating the amount was for "rent." Dane Watkins testified that he 
thought the $923.00 may have been for property taxes, but he wasn't sure. Therefore, based on the record, 
the Court finds that the $923 .00 should be credited against the unpaid rent claimed by Plaintiff. 
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with a year's worth of food and drink credit each December for the following year. 
Defendants have not provided to Plaintiff any food and drink credit since December 
2007, at which time they prepaid the credit through 2008. 
Addendum B to the Lease apportions certain maintenance responsibilities 
between the Parties. Plaintiffs responsibilities are denoted by the letter "L," while 
Defendants' responsibilities are denoted by the letter . " Responsibility for roof repair is 
designated as "T %." The Lease does not specify the exact percentage for which 
Defendants are responsible. 
The Brownstone shares a building with other businesses. The portion of roof 
above the Brownstone only accounts for approximately 60 percent of the building's total 
rooftop. 
In the spring of 2005, Watkins hired Briggs Roofing Company to repair the roof. 
Once Briggs repaired a portion of the roof including approximately 20 feet of the roof 
above the Brovmstone, Storms paid $1,780.00 to Plaintiff for the work done on the 
Brownstone's roof Then, on December 23, 2005, Storms paid an additional $5,000.00 to 
Plaintiff for repairs on the remainder of the Brownstone's roof. On June 21. 2007, Storms 
paid an extra $500.00 to Plaintiff as part of a settlement with Briggs Roofing over alleged 
substandard repair work. On June 22, 2007, Plaintiff paid Briggs Roofing the $5,500.00 it 
had received from Storms. 
Plaintiff hired Waters Construction to repair damage allegedly caused by Briggs 
Roofing's defective roof repair. Repair work was performed on the interior of the 
building such as repairing water damaged sheet rock. On December 4, 2007, Plaintiff 
paid Waters Construction $4,000.00 for the work it performed on the Property. 
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Subject to ce1iain limitations, the Lease grants Defendants the right to have "an 
outside deck." Further, Addendum D to the Lease references construction of a new 
sidewalk and concrete flatwork adjace1 1t to the Brownstone "where some planter boxes 
and seating will be constructed." Since 2002, Defendants have used a po1iion of the 
sidewalk area in front of the Brownstone in the summer months for additional seating. 
Defendants have not paid any additional rent for use of the outside seating area and, until 
recently, Plaintiff never requested that additional rent be paid for this space. 
Pursuant to an oral agreement between the Parties, Defendants stored dry goods in 
an upstairs storage space inside the Brownstone (the Upstairs Space) from the beginning 
of the Lease through July 2009. Defendants paid $100.00 per month in rent for use of the 
Upstairs Space. In June 2008, Plaintiff informed Storms that it was terminating the 
month-to-month oral lease for the Upstairs Space, but that Storms could continue using 
the Upstairs Space at an increased rent of $750.00. Despite this notice, Storms continued 
to use the space for storage, continued to pay $100 a month until eventually vacating the 
Upstairs Space in August 2009. 
The Lease explicitly excludes from its coverage certain additional storage space 
inside the Brownstone referred to as "Space #16." The Lease grants Defendants a right of 
first refusal to rent Space #16 if and when it becomes available. As a courtesy, Plaintiff 
allowed Defendants to use Space # 16 rent-free from the beginning of the Lease through 
June 2008, at which time Plaintiff demanded that Storms vacate Space # 16. Storms 
continued to use Space # 16 through July 2009. 
In October 2006, Storms began storing a walk-in cooler on a portion of Plaintiffs 
property near the Brownstone referred to as the "Pipeyard." The Lease does not cover use 




of the Pipeyard and Storms never paid any rent for storing the walk-in cooler at the 
Pipeyard. In June 2008, Plaintiff advised Storms that he owed a "reasonable rental value'' 
for storing the cooler at the Pipeyard. Storms removed the cooler in June 2009. 
In May 2007. a bridge providing access from Lindsay Boulevard to the 
Brownstone's parking lot was damaged. Due to safety concerns, Plaintiff diverted traffic 
away from the bridge. The bridge remained closed until April 2008. In response to 
Plaintifrs alleged failure to timely repair the damaged bridge, Storms withheld partial 
rent from November 2007 through March 2008. 
Storms again withheld partial and then full rent from April 2008 through the 
summer of 2008 due to Plaintiffs alleged failure to repair the Brownstone's leaking roof. 
On June 12. 2008. Plaintiffs attorney, Bryan Smith. sent Storms· attorney, 
Bradley Williams, a letter addressing ''multiple issues" between the Parties. The letter 
demanded that Defendants pay $34,025.00 and provide certain gross sales information to 
Plaintiff within IO days. Storms did not pay the amount requested in the letter or provide 
the sales information to Plaintiff. 
On July 10. 2008, Plaintiff sent Storms a "Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit 
the Premises" (the July Notice), wherein Plaintiff demanded $17,900.00 for unpaid 
"rent." The July Notice stated that if Storms paid the full amount listed therein within 
three days, then he "may remain in possession of the premises and in compliance with the 
lease agreement." Storms timely paid the full amount requested in the July Notice. 
On September 12, 2008, Plaintiff sent Storms another "Three Day Notice to Pay 
Rent or Quit the Premises" (the September Notice), wherein Plaintiff demanded 
$6,219.00 for unpaid "rent." The September Notice stated that if Storms paid the full 




amount listed therein within three days, then he "may remam 111 possession of the 
premises and in compliance with the lease agreement." Storms timely paid the full 
amount requested in the September Notice. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Failure to Pay Rent and Remedies 
Count 1 of the Amended Complaint alleges a breach of the Lease Agreement for 
failure to pay rent. While the lease identified a term to begin on April 1, 1997, the Lease 
does not specifically identify a monthly date when rent is due. Addendum A to the Lease 
provides for a final calculation and payment of rent by the 15 th of each month. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the payment of rent prior to the 15th of each month was 
timely. Payment of rent on or before the 15 th of each month is also consistent with the 
Patiies' course of conduct. 
This Comi previously ruled that the provision in the Lease providing for rent 
based upon 5% of gross sales was applicable throughout the term of the lease, with the 
exception of the initial months of the lease which was covered by prepaid rent. There is 
no dispute that historically Defendants failed to consistently pay rent when the 5% of 
gross sales provision was applicable. Storms further testified that he withheld rent 
payments based upon grievances he had with Plaintiff regarding parking lot access, roof 
repair, etc. There is no provision in the Lease allowing the tenant to withhold rent as an 
offset for some real or perceived deficiency in the premises. While remedies exist for 
such tenant complaints, the remedy is not a unilateral decision to withhold rent. Failure 
to pay rent under these circumstances was a material breach of the Lease. 




Based upon a period of nonpayment of rent, Plaintiff served upon Defendant a 
Three Day Notice to pay rent dated July 10, 2008. Ex. 18. The notice provided that if 
$17.900 was paid within three days, Defendant "may remain in possession of the 
property and in compliance with the lease agreement". The evidence established that the 
$17,900 amount was based upon a calculation of base rent due. Nothing in the Notice or 
subsequent payment by Defendant referred to rent which may be due under the 5% 
provision. Fmthermore, the language in the Notice did not unequivocally indicate that 
payment of the amount would constitute full payment of all rent due under the Lease. 
Rather, upon payment Defendants " ... may remain ... in compliance ,vith the lease 
agreement." ( emphasis added). 
Defendants haYe asserted that payment pursuant to the Notice was an accord and 
satisfaction resolving all outstanding claims for payment. Defendants bear the burden of 
proving all of the elements of an accord and satisfaction. 
An "[a]ccord and satisfaction applies only if the parties knowingly and 
intentionally accept new obligations or a different contractual 
relationship.'' Hoglan 1·. First Security Bank of Idaho, NA., 120 Idaho 
682,819 P.2d 100 (1991) (citing Harris v. Wildcat Corp., 97 Idaho 884. 
556 P.2d 67 (1976)). The elements of an accord and satisfaction are: 
( 1) a bona fide dispute as to the amount owed; (2) that the debtor tendered 
an amount to the creditor with the intent that such payment would be in 
total satisfaction of the debt owed to the creditor; and (3) that the creditor 
agreed to accept payment in full satisfaction of the debt, or that both the 
debtor and the creditor understood that the acceptance of the check was in 
full payment of all sums owed by the debtor. 
Perkins v. Highland Enterprises, Inc .. 120 Idaho 511, 817 P .2d 177 ( 1991) 
(citing Fairchildv. Mathews, 91 Idaho 1,415 P.2d 43 (1966)). Accord and 
satisfaction is an affirmative defense. See Bryan & Co. v. Kieckbusch, 94 
Idaho 116, 482 P .2d 91 (1971 ). Therefore, the burden was upon Beard to 
prove all the elements of an accord and satisfaction. See Clay v. Rossi, 62 
Idaho 140, 108 P .2d 506 (1940). Since an accord and satisfaction is 
basically the substitution of one contract for another, the debtor must 
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prove that the creditor "definitely assented" to the new arrangement. 
Nelson v. Armstrong, 99 Idaho 422, 582 P.2d 1100 (1978). 
Beard v. George, 135 Idaho 685,689, 23 P.3d 147, 151 (2001). 
The Court finds that the weight of the evidence establishes that the Notice 
applied only to base rent due under the Lease. At the time, Plaintiff did not have 
documentation of gross sales by which it could calculate or propose a resolution as to rent 
which may have been owed under the 5% provision. The Notice was not intended to be, 
nor considered to be, a resolution of the ongoing issue of whether additional rent was 
owed under the 5% provision. Accordingly, payment of the amount set out in the Notice 
did not cure prior failures to pay 5% of gross sales as rent. It did however constitute an 
accord and satisfaction to all claims for base rent and interest and late fees arising from 
the nonpayment of base rent. 
The same is true for the Three Day Notice dated September 12, 2008. While 
payment of the amount claimed in that notice resolved all issues of base rent due at that 
time, it did not cure any default for unpaid rent due pursuant to the 5% provision. 
In addition to the foregoing, where payment is made by a negotiable instrument, 
l.C. § 28-3-310 applies. Specifically,§ 28-3-310(2) requires a conspicuous statement that 
payment is for full satisfaction of all claims. The burden of proof to establish such a 
conspicuous statement and a discharge of debt pursuant to the statute is on the debtor. 
Holley v. Holley, 128 Idaho 503, 915 P.2d 733 (App. 1996). The Court finds that there 
was no conspicuous statement where the instrument indicated payment in full for all rent 
which may have accrued under the 5% provision. 
The record further establishes that after the September 12, 2008 notice, Defendant 
failed to pay rent pursuant to the 5% provision. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS~); bA W 
(_ . ._ 
8 
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant materially breached the Lease by 
failing to pay rent. Damages for failure to pay rent pursuant to the Lease are $20,965 (the 
amount claimed of $21,888 less the amount of an overpayment in August/September 
2007 of $923 ). 
The Lease also provided for 1 % interest per month on delinquent rent. This 
interest rate would apply to unpaid rent pursuant to the 5% of gross sales provision. The 
Court calculates that interest has accrued on the foregoing unpaid rent in the amount of 
$3,781.25. 
Plaintiff has also argued that a breach occurred when Defendant failed to provide 
monthly sales reports. The Court agrees. Defendant was obligated to provide monthly 
sales reports pursuant to the Lease, but failed to do so. There are, however, no 
separate/additional damages arising from this breach. 
Having found a breach of the Lease by Defendants. the Court turns to the issue of 
whether Plaintiff is entitled to an eviction of Defendant from the prope11y. The Lease 
provides that upon a breach, the landlord may elect to terminate the lease: "In the event 
of any breach of this lease by Lessee, Lessor may, at his option, terminate the lease .. .''. 
By its complaint, it is clear Plaintiff has elected to terminate the lease. Furthermore, 
Plaintiff is entitled to terminate the lease inasmuch as the Court has found a material 
breach on the part of the Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to evict Defendant 
from the premises and regain possession. 
As damages from the breach, Plaintiff also seeks accelerated rent. Paragraph 22 of 
the Lease provides that Watkins may recover upon termination of the lease "the amount 
by which unpaid rent for the balance of the term after the time of the award exceeds the 
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amount of such rental loss that Lessee proves could be reasonably avoided ... ". Based 
on the term of the Lease going through the year 2027, Plaintiff seeks in excess of one 
million dollars for accelerated rent. 
Pursuant to the Lease, recovery for unpaid rent is based on the "worth at the time 
of the award" of the unpaid rent. In other words, the value or worth of unpaid future rent 
was to be reduced to a present value. While the evidence set out what the total amount of 
unpaid rent would be through 2027, there was no evidence reducing that amount to a 
present value i.e., its worth at the time of trial. 
A second issue relates to whether such a prov1s10n is enforceable. The Court 
considers the accelerated rent prov1s10n to be tantamount to a liquidated damages 
provision in the event of a breach of the Lease. See W. L. Scott, Inc. v. Afadras Aerotech, 
Inc. 103 Idaho 736,747.653 P.2d 791,802 (1982). The analysis to be applied was well 
stated in Miller 1·. Remior, 86 ldaho 121, 128-129, 383 P.2d 596,600 - 601 (1963): 
In Graves v. Cu pie, supra, after an exhaustive analysis of the law bearing on 
the subject, this Court reiterated the rule adopted in this jurisdiction, well 
expressed by Perkins v. S'pencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446, quoting from 
the earlier case of Bramwell Inv. Co. v. Uggla, 81 Utah 85, 16 P.2d 913, as 
follows: 
"* * * This corn1 is committed to the doctrine, that where the parties to a 
contract stipulate the amount of liquidated damages that shall be paid in case 
of a breach, such stipulation is, as a general rule, enforceable, if the amount 
stipulated is not disproportionate to the damages actually sustained." 
This Court then reiterated the converse of such rule. also adopted in this 
jurisdiction, that where the damages stipulated by the parties are clearly 
unconscionable, exorbitant and arbitrary, and bear no reasonable relation to the 
damages which the parties could have anticipated from the breach which 
occurred, then the provision is to be interpreted as for a penalty and is 
unenforceable. See also Scogings v. Love, 79 Idaho 179, 312 P.2d 570; Walker 
v. Nunnenkamp, 84 Idaho 485, 373 P.2d 559. The rule is well stated in Howard 
v. Bar Bell Land & Cattle Co., 81 Idaho 189,197.340 P.2d 103, as follows: 
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'It is the lawful privilege of the parties to a contract for the sale of real 
property to make time of performance of the essence of their agreement. It is 
also their privilege to agree in advance upon the damages to be recompensed in 
case of breach. The courts, both at law and in equity, must respect the 
provisions of a contract lawfully agreed to. (Citations.) But. where the facts 
make the damage agreed to an unconscionable penalty, equity will intercede to 
grant relief. (Citation.)' 
The law as set out in Jvliller was more recently stated in Hecla Jvlin. Co. v. Star-
Morning Min Co., 122 Idaho 778,796,839 P.2d 1192, 1210 (1992): 
As a part of this allegation, plaintiffs argue that they may hold defendant 
to the letter of the termination provisions of the 1984 Lease. They cite to 
Nichols v. Knowles, 87 Idaho 550, 394 P.2d 630 (1964), and Howard v. 
Bar Bell Land & Cattle Co., 81 Idaho 189,340 P.2d 103 (1959) for the 
proposition that courts must 'respect the provisions of a contract lawfully 
agreed to.' A closer look at both of these cases shows that where the 
provisions of a contract, when strictly applied, would cause a forfeiture 
and a resulting unconscionable penalty, equity will intercede to grant 
relief. Nichols v. Knowles, 87 Idaho 550, 394 P.2d at 633; Howard v. Bar 
Bell Land & Cattle Co., 81 Idaho 189, 340 P.2d at 107. The Idaho 
Supreme Court in both Nichols and Howard cite to Graves v. Cupic et al., 
75 Idaho 451, 272 P.2d 1020 (1954). Graves clearly states that forfeitures 
are abhorred by the co mis. Id, 2 72 P .2d at 1023. 
As Plaintiff has argued, the burden is on the defendant to show that damages 
awardable as accelerated rent are exorbitant or unconscionable. Howard v. Bar Bell Land 
& Cattle Co., 81 Idaho 189, 340 P.2d 103 (1959); Scott, Inc. v. Madras Aerotech, lnc., 
supra. 
Based on the foregoing, the critical issue is whether the liquidated damages are so 
disproportionate to the damages actually sustained as to be exorbitant or unconscionable. 
The Court finds that they are. 
Actual damages would be based upon the time Defendant vacated the prope1iy to 
the time a substitute tenant began paying rent. There is no basis to conclude that Plaintiff 
could not find within a reasonable time a substitute tenant(s) upon regaining possession 
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of the property. Such would in fact be Plaintiffs duty. Evidence was clear that the 
building is in a very desirable location and as such, \vould draw the interest of many 
potential tenants. While there may have been little evidence as to how long it might 
actually take to re-lease the property, it is beyond reason to suggest it would take 
anything close to seventeen years. 
Accordingly, the Court finds the accelerated rent provision to be a penalty and 
forfeiture, and therefore unenforceable. 
2. Late Fees 
The Lease provides for a late charge of $100 for each late rental payment. The 
Court finds that late charges are applicable to those months when 5% of gross sales was 
to be paid as rent, yet after deduction of credits, remained unpaid. Those months totaled 
twenty-eight. Accordingly, Plaintiffs damages based upon late charges are $2,800. 
3. Roof Repair 
The Lease provides for the Parties' respective obligations with regard to interior 
and exterior walls, pO\ver. roof, etc. See Addendum B. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 
have failed to pay their share of roof expenses which, according to Plaintiff, includes 
repairs to the inside of the building necessitated by leaking from the defective roof 
repairs. As set out in Addendum B, next to the various maintenance items there is an "L" 
indicating the responsibility of the landlord or a "T'" representing the responsibility of the 
tenant. T\VO notable exceptions to the foregoing are the roof which states "T¾" and 
electrical power which states "* T 50%". The asterisk to that entry clarifies that 
"Landlord pays 50% of electric power during the term of the lease". 
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Finding that the reference T% was ambiguous, the Court allowed parol evidence 
on that issue. Storms testified that the agreement was that the tenant and landlord would 
equally share expenses for the roof over the Brownstone restaurant area i.e., 50% each. 
Watkins testified that the landlord bore no responsibility for the roof. 
It is significant that Watkins undertook the responsibility to hire the roofing 
contractor and coordinate and supervise the repairs. Such evidence lends itself to the 
conclusion that the landlord was at least partially responsible for the cost of repairs. The 
Court finds that the weight of the evidence establishes that the roof over the Brownstone 
was to be an equally shared expense between the tenant and landlord. 2 Based on the 
amount charged and paid for the repairs, the Court finds that there are no further amounts 
owed by Defendants. 
As a related matter, Defendant was granted an ongoing objection as to evidence 
relating to a claim that Defendant had a responsibility for internal repairs required by 
water damage. Defendant's objection was based on the grounds that such a claim was 
outside the scope of the pleadings. Plaintiffs claim in this regard is contained in Count 
Four of Plaintiffs amended complaint, which claim is limited to "roof repair expenses". 
The Court hereby sustains Defendants' objection on the grounds that any claim based 
upon anything other than repairs to the roof is outside the scope of the pleadings. 
4. Upstairs Storage Area 
Plaintiff seeks to recover rent for the upstairs storage space. The Paiiies had 
previously entered into an unwritten agreement that rent on the storage area would be 
2 See also Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, iJ 22, wherein Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to pay their 
"p01tion" of the expenses. 
FINDINGS OFF ACT AND CONCLUSIONS Qfi .LAiW 
_-: . .. 1 q 
13 
$100 a month. There was no evidence that the arrangement was anything other than a 
tenancy at will, which could be terminated upon a month's notice. LC.§ 55-208. 
At least by January, 2007, Plaintiff desired to increase the rent for the storage 
area. In a letter dated June 12, 2008 from Plaintiffs counsel to Defendants' counseL 
Plaintiff notified Defendants that the $100 a month lease was terminated, but that 
Defendants could continue to use the storage area based upon a rental of $750 a month. 
ldaho Code § 55-307 provides as follows: 
In all leases of lands or tenements, or of any interest therein from month to 
month, the landlord may, upon giving notice in writing at least fifteen (15) 
days before the expiration of the month, change the terms of the lease, to 
take effect at the expiration of the month. The notice, when served upon 
the tenant, shall of itself operate and be effectual to create and establish, as 
a part of the lease, the terms, rent and conditions specified in the notice, if 
the tenant shall continue to hold the premises after the expiration of the 
month. 
Accordingly, rental of the upstairs storage area as of July 1, 2008 was in the 
amount of $750 a month. Defendants' decision to continue to use the storage area 
through July 2009 subjected them to the $750 a month rental charge. Defendants 
however, breached the month-to-month lease by continuing to use the prope1iy but not 
paying the $750 a month rent. Watkins' damages on this issue after giving Defendants 
credit for the $100 a month paid by Defendants are $8,450. 
5. Storage Cooler 
Watkins seeks to recover on the basis that Defendants were unjustly enriched by 
keeping a storage cooler in the "pipeyard" area of Watkins' property. There was no 
evidence that the pipeyard was a critical or imp01iant area of the premises. The cooler 
was first stored in the pipeyard in October 2006. There was no discussion of rent being 
paid for storage until June 2008, when Plaintiff advised Storms that he owed a 
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"reasonable rental value" for storing the cooler at the Pipeyard. No rent was paid and 
Storms removed the cooler in June 2009. 
Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing an unjust enrichment claim. 
The elements of unjust enrichment are that (1) a benefit is conferred on the 
defendant by the plaintiff; (2) the defendant appreciates the benefit; and 
(3) it would be inequitable for the defendant to accept the benefit without 
payment of the value of the benefit. Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 
759, 133 P.3d 1211, 1224 (2006). 
Teton Peaks Inv. Co., LLC v. Ohme, 146 Idaho 394,398, 195 P.3d 1207, 211 (2008). 
There was no evidence that Plaintiff needed the area of storage for some other 
purpose. The Court finds that the initial storage of the cooler was permissive and as an 
accommodation by the landlord to the tenant. While there was clearly a benefit to 
Defendants, it would not be inequitable under these circumstances to allow storage 
without the payment of rent. However, Defendants were notified in June 2008 of the 
need to pay a reasonable amount as rent for the cooler storage. Following that notice, it 
would be inequitable to continue to store the cooler without paying a rental value. 
Accordingly, the Comi finds that a fair value for the unjust enrichment for the cooler 
storage was $100 a month from July 2008 through June 2009, for a total of$ L200. 
6. Space 16. 
Plaintiff seeks to recover for the alleged unjust enrichment to Defendants for their 
use of an area known as Space 16. That space was not part of the leased premises 
although Defendants had the first right of refusal to the space. Nevertheless, Plaintiff 
allowed Defendants to use the space as a storage area rent free until June 2008 when 
Plaintiff requested that all of Defendants' property be removed from the space. However, 
Storms continued to use Space #16 through July 2009. 
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The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to recover under the theory of unjust 
enrichment for the use of Space 16. Value of the unjust enrichment was $200 a month 
from July 2008 through June 2009, for a total of $2,400. 
7. Outdoor Dining Area. 
Plaintiff seeks to recover under the theory of unjust enrichment for Defendants' 
use of the area in front of the building for outdoor dining. Addendum B to the Lease 
grants Defendants authority to use an "outside deck" for dining. The word "deck" is not 
defined in the Lease. The Parties introduced parol evidence as to their intent regarding 
outside dining, which included the possibility of a second floor platform over a portion of 
the parking lot, or dining on the areas adjacent to the building. The primary concern as 
set out in the Addendum was that outdoor dining not interfere with parking. 
The Court finds that the historical use of the subject area for outdoor dining was 
consistent with the Lease. The Court finds no material difference between an elevated 
wood "deck" or a ground level concrete "deck", as long as it did not interfere with 
parking. Additionally, to the extent the outdoor dining area required landlord approval, 
the evidence established that Watkins was aware of the use and made no complaint for a 
number of years. Approval of the designated area for outside dining was at least implicit. 
Additionally, Defendant has raised the defense of laches. The Court finds that 
defense applicable to Plainti±rs claim that outdoor dining was a breach of the Lease, or 
grounds for unjust enrichment. 
It is further worth noting that increased revenue to the restaurant through outside 
dining was also beneficial to Plaintiff inasmuch rental based on 5% of gross sales would 
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increase. As such, even if use of the outdoor area wasn't contemplated by the Lease, there 
is no inequity to the landlord since the landlord also benefits from the use. 
8. Food and Drink Credit. 
Addendum A to the Lease provides the following: 
Landlord will be entitled to a $250 food and drink credit per month 
to be used at his discretion, i.e., gift ce1iificates or food and drink. This 
credit will be cumulative. 
The evidence establishes that Defendants have not provided to Plaintiff any food 
and drink credit after 2008. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to $250 
of food and drink credit for each month from January 2009 forward. Failing to provide 
the credit constitutes a breach of the Lease. Plaintiffs damages from that breach are 
equal to the amount of the credit which was to be provided. As of February 28, 2010, 
damages are $3,500. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant materially breached the Lease and Plaintiff is therefore entitled to 
terminate the Lease, evict Defendant, and regain possession of the prope1iy. Plaintiff is 
fmiher entitled to recover damages for breach of the leases and for unjust enrichment. 
Plaintiffs damages in this matter are $43,096.25. 
Dated this {{p day of March, 2010. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this~- day of March, 2010, I did send a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the 
correct postage thereon: by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse 
mailbox: or by causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
B.J. Driscoll 
Stv1ITH DRISCOLL & 
AS SOCIA TES. PLLC 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Michael J. Whyte 
THOMSEN STEPHENS 
LAW OFFICES. PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls. ID 83404 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
By :yn4/ 
Deputy Clerk 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
lO p . 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUl\JTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MICHAEL STORMS and KA THY 
BURGGRAF, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-7258 
JUDGMENT 
IN THIS MATTER, the court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, dated March 16, 2010, it is hereby ordered that a Judgment be entered herein 
against the said Defendants, Michael Storms and Kathy Burggraf, in accordance with said 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on file herein. 
WHEREFORE, by reason of the law and the premises aforesaid, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that The Watkins Company, LLC, plaintiff, 
does have and recover of and from said defendants, Michael Storms and Kathy Burggraf, 
,JUDGMENT - Page 1 
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the sum of $43 .096.25, and that plaintiff further recover lawful interest on the foregoing 
judgment until paid and that execution may issue on the foregoing judgment. 
JUDGMENT RENDERED this '1-:> day of March, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .i13day of March, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the attached JUDGMENT to be served, by placing the same in a sealed 
envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, 
facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. 
SMITH. DRISCOLL & 
ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. 0. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0731 
J Michael J. Whyte, 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW 
OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
JUDGMENT - Page 2 
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[ ] Fax 
[ J Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
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[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Email 
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B. J. Driscoll, Esq. --ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls. Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
TIIE WATKTNS COMPANY, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MICHAEL STORMS and KATHY 
BURGGRAF, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-7258 
.JUDGMENT FOR RESTITUTION 
MAR 2 1i 2010 
lN THIS MATTER. the court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, dated March 16, 2010, that the plaintiff is entitled to evict the Defendants, 
Michael Storms and Kathy Burggraf, and to restitution of the premises, it is hereby 
ordered that this Judgment for Restitution be entered herein against the said Defendants 
in accordance with said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on file herein. 
WHEREFORE, by reason of the law and the premises aforesaid, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that The Watkins Company, LLC, plaintiff, 
242 
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is entitled to judgment for restitution of the premises located at 455 River Parkway, Idaho 
Falls. Idaho, and that execution may issue immediately by writ of restitution. 
FURTHER. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED 
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 6-316 that the defendants forfeit their lease of the 
aforesaid premises. 
JUDGMENT RENDERED this L ·-;- day of March, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
__,. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this dQ day of March, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the attached JUDGMENT FOR RESTITUTION to be served, by 
placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the 
follmving: 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & 
AS SOCIA TES, PLLC 
P. 0. Box 5073 I 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0731 
J Michael J. Whyte, Esq. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW 
OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Cham1ing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Clerk 
')4' 3 ,... .. 
[ GY'U. S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Email 
[vJ U. S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Email 
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414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, fN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
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Case No. CV-08-7258 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST 
On March 16, 2010, this court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
("Findings & Conclusions") regarding the claims of the plaintiff, The Watkins Company, 
LLC ("Watkins"), against the defendants, Michael Storms and Kathy Burggraf 
("Defendants"). In its Findings & Conclusions, the court previously awarded Watkins 
prejudgment interest on unpaid alternative rent. Watkins now seeks to recover 
prejudgment interest on the unpaid Late Fees, Upstairs Storage, Pipeyard Storage, Space 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR A WARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST - Page 1 
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16 Storage, and Food and Drink Credit that the court awarded. As set forth below, 
Watkins requests that the court award prejudgment interest in the amount of $3,005.92. 
II. WATKINS IS ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IN THE AMOUNT 
OF $3,005.92. 
Idaho Code Section 28-22-104 calls for the award of prejudgment interest on 
certain types of money claims. Jones v. Whiteley, 112 Idaho 886 (Ct.App.1987). 
Prejudgment interest is allowed where the damages are liquidated or readily ascertainable 
by mathematical process. Id.; Child v. Blaser, 111 Idaho 702 (Ct.App.1986). "[W]here 
the amount of liability is liquidated or capable of ascertainment by mere mathematical 
processes" interest is allowed from a time prior to judgment, "for in that event the 
interest in fully compensating the injured party predominates over other equitable 
considerations." Farm Dev. Corp. v. Hernandez, 93 Idaho 918 (1970) (emphasis added) 
(quoting United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Clover Creek Cattle Co., 92 Idaho 
889, 900 (1969)); see also Doolittle v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 805, 
814, (1996); Davis v. Prof! Bus.Serv., Inc., 109 Idaho 810, 817 (1985); Child v. Blaser, 
supra, 111 Idaho at 706-707. 
The mere fact that a claim is disputed or litigated does not render damages 
"unascertainable," for if this were the case, a party could delay payment without 
incurring interest expense by disputing and litigating any claim, and prejudgment interest 
would never be awarded. Ace Realty, Inc., v. Anderson, 106 Idaho 742, 751 
(Ct.App.1984); see also Mitchell v. Flandro, 95 Idaho 228, 235 (1972). A claim is 
liquidated if the evidence furnishes data which, if believed, makes it possible to compute 
the amount with exactness, without reliance upon opinion or discretion. Seubert 
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Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon Corp., 125 Idaho 744, 75011. 2 (Ct.App. l 993t affd, 125 Idaho 
409 (1994). 
A. The Court Should Award $931.30 In Prejudgment Interest On The Unpaid 
Late Fees. 
Here, the court found the Defendants liable to Watkins for late fees for those 28 
months that Defendants did not pay the full rent due under the lease. The Lease provides 
that "Tenant agrees to pay a late charge of $100 plus interest at 1 % per month on the 
delinquent amount." 1 The late fees are liquidated and mathematically ascertainable, so 
Watkins is entitled to prejudgment interest in the amount of $931.30, calculated by taking 
the $100 late fee multiplied by 12%, then divided by 365 days to detennine a daily rate of 
simple interest, then multiplied by the number of days from the date the late fee accrued 
through the date the court entered the judgment on March 23, 201 o.2 
B. The Court Should Award $1,241.38 In Prejudgment Interest On The 
Unpaid Upstairs Storage Rent. 
Here. the court found the Defendants liable to Watkins for Upstairs Storage rent of 
$650 per month from July 2008 through July 2009. The rent is liquidated and 
mathematically ascertainable, so Watkins is entitled to prejudgment interest in the amount of 
$1,241.38, calculated by taking the $650 unpaid rent per month multiplied by 12%, then 
divided by 365 days to determine a daily rate of simple interest, then multiplied by the 
number of days from the date the rent accrued through the date the court entered the 
judgment on March 23, 2010.3 
1 See i2 of Plaintiffs Exhibit I. 
2 To illustrate these calculations, please see Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
3 To illustrate these calculations, please see Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
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C. The Court Should Award $182.27 In Prejudgment Interest On The Unpaid 
Pipeyard Storage. 
Here, the court found the Defendants liable to Watkins for Pipeyard Cooler Storage 
of $ 100 per month from July 2008 through June 2009. This amount is liquidated and 
mathematically ascertainable, so Watkins is entitled to prejudgment interest in the amount of 
$182.27, calculated by taking the $100 per month multiplied by 12%, then divided by 365 
days to determine a daily rate of simple interest, then multiplied by the number of days from 
the date the late fee accrued through the date the court entered the judgment on March 23, 
2010.4 
D. The Court Should Award $364.54 In Prejudgment Interest On The Unpaid 
Space # 16 Storage. 
Here, the court found the Defendants liable to Watkins for Space # 16 Storage of 
$200 per month from July 2008 through June 2009. This amount is liquidated and 
mathematically ascertainable, so Watkins is entitled to prejudgment interest in the amount of 
$364.54, calculated by taking the $200 per month multiplied by 12%, then divided by 365 
days to determine a daily rate of simple interest, then multiplied by the number of days from 
the date the late fee accrued through the date the court entered the judgment on March 23, 
2010.5 
E. The Court Should Award $286.44 In Prejudgment Interest On The Unpaid 
Food And Drink Credit. 
Here, the court found the Defendants liable to Watkins for unpaid Food and Drink 
Credits of $250 per month from January 2009 through February 2010. This amount is 
liquidated and mathematically ascertainable, so Watkins is entitled to prejudgment interest 
in the amount of $286.44, calculated by taking the $250 per month multiplied by 12%, then 
4 To illustrate these calculations, please see Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
5 To illustrate these calculations, please see Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
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divided by 365 days to determine a daily rate of simple interest, then multiplied by the 
number of days from the date the late fee accrued through the date the court entered the 
judgment on March 23, 2010.6 
III. CONCLUSION. 
Based on the foregoing, the court should award Watkins $3,005.92 in 
prejudgment interest. 
DATED this 5( day of March, 2010. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
. J Driscoll, Esq. 
:ys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _1L day of March, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the attached BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AWARD OF 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST to be served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope 
and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile 
transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
J Michael J. Whyte, Esq. [ ~ S. Mail 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW [ ] Fax 
OFFICES, PLLC [ ] Overnight Delivery 
2635 Channing Way [ ] Hand Delivery 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 [ ] Email 
6 To illustrate these calculations, please see Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
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Space 16 Storage 
Food & Drink Credit 
TOTAL 








Days thru At 12% 
Month Late Fee 3/23/2010* Interest 
Dec-03 $ 100.00 2289 $ 75.25 
May-04 $ 100.00 2137 $ 70.26 
Jul-04 $ 100.00 2076 $ 68.25 
Auq-04 $ 100.00 2045 $ 67.23 
Jun-05 $ 100.00 1741 $ 57.24 
Jul-05 $ 100.00 1711 $ 56.25 
Auq-05 $ 100.00 1680 $ 55.23 
Sep-05 $ 100.00 1649 $ 54.21 
May-06 $ 100.00 1407 $ 46.26 
Jun-06 $ 100.00 1376 $ 45.24 
Auq-06 $ 100.00 1315 $ 43.23 
May-07 $ 100.00 1042 $ 34.26 
Jun-07 $ 100.00 1011 $ 33.24 
Jul-07 $ 100.00 981 $ 32.25 
Auq-07 $ 100.00 950 $ 31.23 
May-08 $ 100.00 676 $ 22.22 
Jun-08 $ 100.00 645 $ 21.21 
Jul-08 $ 100.00 615 $ 20.22 
Auq-08 $ 100.00 584 $ 19.20 
Sep-08 $ 100.00 553 $ 18.18 
Apr-09 $ 100.00 341 $ 11.21 
May-09 $ 100.00 311 $ 10.22 
Jun-09 $ 100.00 280 $ 9.21 
Jul-09 $ 100.00 250 $ 8.22 
Auq-09 $ 100.00 219 $ 7.20 
Sep-09 $ 100.00 188 $ 6.18 
Oct-09 $ 100.00 158 $ 5.19 
Dec-09 $ 100.00 97 $ 3.19 
Totals $ 2,800.00 $ 931.30 
*Days calculated from the 16th of the month due. 
Upstairs Days thru At 12% 
Month Storage 3/23/2010 Interest 
Jul~08 $ 650.00 630 $ 134.63 
Aug-08 $ 650.00 599 $ 128.01 
Sep-08 $ 650.00 568 $ 121.38 
Oct-08 $ 650.00 538 $ 114.97 
Nov-08 $ 650.00 507 $ 108.35 
Dec-08 $ 650.00 477 $ 101.93 
Jan-09 $ 650.00 446 $ 95.31 
Feb-09 $ 650.00 415 $ 88.68 
Mar-09 $ 650.00 387 $ 82.70 
Apr-09 $ 650.00 356 $ 76.08 
May-09 $ 650.00 326 $ 69.67 
Jun-09 $ 650.00 295 $ 63.04 
Jul-09 $ 650.00 265 $ 56.63 
Totals $ 8,450.00 $1,241.38 
Days thru I At 12% 
Month Pipeyard 3/23/2010 Interest 
Jul-08 $ 100.00 630 $ 20.71 
Aug-08 $ 100.00 599 $ 19.69 
Sep-08 $ 100.00 568 $ 18.67 
Oct-08 $ 100.00 538 $ 17.69 
Nov-08 $ 100.00 507 $ 16.67 
Dec-08 $ 100.00 477 $ 15.68 
Jan-09 $ 100.00 446 $ 14.66 
Feb-09 $ 100.00 415 $ 13.64 
Mar-09 $ 100.00 387 $ 12.72 
Apr-09 $ 100.00 356 $ 11.70 
Mav-09 $ 100.00 326 $ 10.72 
Jun-09 $ 100.00 295 $ 9.70 
Totals $1,200.00 $ 182.27 
253 
Month Space #16 
Jul-08 $ 200.00 
Aug-08 $ 200.00 
Sep-08 $ 200.00 
Oct-08 $ 200.00 
Nov-08 $ 200.00 
Dec-08 $ 200.00 
Jan-09 $ 200.00 
Feb-09 $ 200.00 
Mar-09 $ 200.00 
Apr-09 $ 200.00 
May-09 $ 200.00 
Jun-09 $ 200.00 
Totals $ 2,400.00 
Days thru 
3/23/2010 




























Food & Drink Days thru At 12% 
Month Credit 3/23/2010 Interest 
Jan-09 $ 250.00 446 $ 36.66 
Feb-09 $ 250.00 415 $ 34.11 
Mar-09 $ 250.00 387 $ 31.81 
Apr-09 $ 250.00 356 $ 29.26 
May-09 $ 250.00 326 $ 26.79 
Jun-09 $ 250.00 295 $ 24.25 
Jul-09 $ 250.00 265 $ 21.78 
Auq-09 $ 250.00 234 $ 19.23 
Sep-09 $ 250.00 203 $ 16.68 
Oct-09 $ 250.00 173 $ 14.22 
Nov-09 $ 250.00 142 $ 11.67 
Dec-09 $ 250.00 112 $ 9.21 
Jan-10 $ 250.00 81 $ 6.66 
Feb-10 $ 250.00 50 $ 4.11 
Totals $ 3,500.00 $ 286.44 
Michael J. Whyte, Esq., ISB #4645 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
26 3 5 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls ID 83404 
Telephone (208)522-1230 
Fax (208)522-1277 
Attorney for Defendants 
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Case No. CV-08-7258 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM RE: COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
COME NOW defendants, by and through their attorney of record and files this Brief in 
support of their motion for attorney fees and costs. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiff filed the complaint in this matter seeking relief under numerous claims. 
Specifically, in the Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, plaintiff sought the following: 
Count One - $23,947.46 for late fees and interest for failing to timely pay the rent; Count Two -
$1,023,750.00 in accelerated rent; Count Three - Failure to provide monthly sales reports and an 
amount to be proven at trial; Count Four - $4,500.00 for roof repair expenses; Count Five -
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$9,400.00 for use of an upstairs storage space; Count Six - $4,900.00 for use of outdoor space to 
store a cooler; Count Seven- $6,800.00 for use of Space # 16; Count Eight - $30,500.00 for use of 
outdoor dining space; Count Nine- Eviction; Count Ten - $250 per month for food and drink credits. 
The total sought by plaintiff was $1,106,797.46 from defendant Michael Storms and $1,055,197.46 
from defendant Kathy Burggraf, (not including the amounts sought for percentage rents not paid). 
At the conclusion of the trial the Court awarded damages to plaintiff in the amount of $43,096.25. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Prior to awarding attorney fees and costs, the Court needs to determine the prevailing party. 
In the case of Sanders v. Lankford, 134 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d. 823 (Ct. App. 2000), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals, in considering whether the trial court had properly acted in determining the prevailing 
party, stated: 
On the prevailing party issue, governing legal standards are provided by Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l )(B), which states: In determining which party to an action 
is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion 
consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by 
the respective parties, whether there were multiple claims, multiple issues, 
counterclaims, third party claims, cross-claims, or other multiple or cross issues 
between the parties, and the extent to which each party prevailed upon each of such 
issue or claims. The trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a party to 
an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may 
apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner 
after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action and resultant 
judgment or judgments obtained. 
Thus, under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B), there are three principal factors the trial court must 
consider when determining which party, if any, prevailed: (1) the final judgment or 
result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) whether there were multiple claims 
or issues between the parties; and (3) the extent to which each of the parties prevailed 
on each of the claims or issues. Chadderdon, l 04 Idaho at 411,659 P.2d at 165. The 
result obtained may be the product of a court judgment or of a settlement reached by 
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the parties. JerryJ Joseph, CL. U Assoc., 117 Idaho at 557, 789 P.2d at 1148; Ladd 
v. Coats, 105 Idaho 250,254,668 P.2d 126, 130 (Ct. App. 1983). 
Sanders 134 Idaho at 325. 
Pursuant to IRCP 54( d)(l )(B) this Court needs to consider the three factors to determine the 
prevailing party. The first factor is the final judgment in relation to the relief sought. As indicated 
previously, plaintiff sought a total amount of $1,106,797.46 from defendant Michael Storms and 
$1,055,197.46 from defendant Kathy Burggraf. However, after all evidence was presented, the Court 
only awarded plaintiff $43,096.25. This is less than 4% of the total sought in plaintiff's amended 
complaint. Thus under the first factor, defendants are the prevailing parties. 
The largest portion of the damages sought was contained in Count Two wherein plaintiff 
sought accelerated rent in the amount of $1,023.750. If this amount is removed from the calculation, 
then the total sought by plaintiff in its amended complaint was $83,047.96, not including the amount 
sought for unpaid percentage rent because that amount was unknown when the amended complaint 
was filed. However, in a motion for partial summary judgment filed a few months prior to trial, 
plaintiff calculated its damages of additional unpaid rent at $28,903.39. Adding this to the 
$83,047.96, then plaintiff was seeking damages in the amount of $111,950.85 (other than the 
accelerated rent). Comparing this to the amount actually recovered, plaintiff only recovered 38% 
of this amount sought. Even removing the greatest single amount sought by plaintiff ( accelerated 
rent), plaintiff recovered significantly less than the original relief sought, leaving defendants as the 
prevailing parties. 
The second and third factors need to be reviewed jointly in that there were multiple claims 
or issues and the result of those claims. In this action, plaintiff's amended complaint raised ten 
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separate counts, each a distinct claim seeking separate relief, not claims plead in the alternative. At 
the conclusion of the trial the Court denied all amounts sought under Count Two, Count Four and 
Count Eight The total sought under these three claims was $1,058,750 The Court awarded some, 
but not all amounts sought in the remaining Counts. Again, in reviewing and comparing the total 
amounts sought in each claim against the total awarded, plaintiff prevailed in only a small portion 
of its claims. 
In reviewing all 54( d)( 1 )(B) factors defendants are the prevailing parties. However, plaintiff 
did prevail on some of its claims. Under these circumstances, the Court could apportion the costs 
and fees in a fair and equitable manner given the issues presented by plaintiff and the relief actually 
awarded to plaintiff. 
DA TED this 6th day of April, 2010. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
~ichao/ 1LJ1hyte, Esq. 
( I 
'--
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and with 
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the 6th day of April, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM RE: COSTS AND ATTORNEY 
FEES to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below their names either by 
depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand 
delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below. 
MJW:clrn 
B J DRISCOLL ESQ 
PO BOX 50731 
IDAHO FALLS ID 83405-073 l 
6753\028 Brief- Attorney Fees 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, 





















Case No. CV-08-7258 
On the 9th day of April, 2010, Defendants' objection to writ 
of possession came before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District 
Judge, in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
No one appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
Mr. Michael Whyte appeared on behalf of the Defendants. 
Mr. Whyte presented Defendants' objection to writ of 
possession. 
There is a joint stipulation to set aside the judgment for 
restitution. The Court will not sign an order for immediate 
possession as things stand at this time. Mr. Whyte will prepare 
a proposed order for the Court's signature. 
nC ·1 (~ u .l 
Court was thus adjourned. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the q day of April, 2010, I 
caused a true and correct cop~ the foregoing document to 
be delivered to the following: 
Bryan D. Smith 
B. J. Driscoll 
PO Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Michael J. Whyte 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Deputy Court Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, 








Case No. CV-08-7258 
On the 20th day of April, 2010, Plaintiff's motion for award 
of prejudgment interest and Defendants' motion for attorney fees 
and costs came before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District 
Judge, in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. B. J. Driscoll appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
Mr. Michael Whyte appeared on behalf of the Defendants. 
Mr. Driscoll presented Plaintiff's motion for award of 
prejudgment interest and presented argument in opposition to 
Defendants' motion for attorney fees and costs. Mr. Whyte 
presented Defendants' motion for attorney fees and costs and 
argument in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for award of 
prejudgment interest. 
The Court will issue a written decision on the motions. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the cl{)_ day of April, 2010, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to 
be delivered to the following: 
Bryan D. Smith 
B. J. Driscoll 
PO Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Michael J. Whyte 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
RONALD LONGMORE 
__ )J~fkJ/~--
Deputy Court Clerk 
L 
HJ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT Of THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL STORMS and KA THY 
BURGGRAF, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-7258 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES AND PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST 
l. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff brought this action seeking to recover on claims arising out of a lease agreement 
and the use of the subject premises by Defendant. Following a court trial, the Court issued its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. As set out in that decision Plaintiff prevailed on 
some, but not all of its claims. Specifically, Plaintiff prevailed on the breach of contract claim 
although no recovery was allowed for roof repairs or outside dining. As to the other breach of 
contract issues, the amount of damages awarded was less than requested. Plaintiff also prevailed 
on unjust enrichment claims although recovery was less than requested. 
Both Parties have now moved for costs and attorney fees. Plaintiff has also moved for an 
award of prejudgment interest. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Costs and Attorney Fees 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
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Under Rule 54(d)(l )(B), I.R.C.P ., it is appropriate to consider results obtained in view of 
the relief sought ,vhen determining a prevailing party: 
In detennining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled 
to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or 
result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. 
In identifying a prevailing pru-ty, a court may consider whether a party prevailed on the 
"main issue'' or ·'most significant issue" which consumed most of the time at trial. Anderson v. 
Schwegel, 118 Idaho 362,367, 796 P.2d 1035, 1040 (App. 1990); Chadderdon v. King, 104 
Idaho 406, 659 P.2d 160 (App. 1983); Rural Kootenai Organization, Inc. v. Board of Com'rs 
133 Idaho 833, 846, 993 P.2d 596, 609 (1999). The fact that the damages recovered by a party 
were less than requested does not preclude a finding that the paiiy prevailed: "We do not believe 
that merely because Collins received less than the entire runount of damages requested, she is 
therefore not a prevailing party." Collins v. Jones, 131 Idaho 556, 559, 961 P.2d 647,650 
(1998). See also Gilbert v. City ofCaldwell, 112 Idaho 386, P.2d 355, wherein the 
prevailing party only recovered approximately $7,500 of the total amount claimed of over 
$160,000. 
Here, the Comi considers the main issue in the litigation to be Defendant's breach of 
contract and failure to pay the required rental amount. Plaintiff prevailed on that issue. 
Considering the total outcome of the trial and the Parties' respective success and failure, the 
Court finds Plaintiff to be the prevailing party. 
Significantly, Rule 54(e)(3), 1.R.C.P. provides that the "results obtained" is a factor for 
consideration in determining the amount of attorney fees to be awarded. Accordingly, the Court 
has discretion to consider Plaintiffs limited recovery for purposes of tempering an award of 
attorney fees, but not for precluding outright a finding that Plaintiff was the prevailing party. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
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As the prevailing pa1iy, Plaintiff is entitled to costs as a matter of right (Rule 54( d)(l )(C)) 
in the amount of $1 J 78.53. As to Plaintiffs claim for discretionary costs under Rule 
54( d)( 1 )(D), the Court finds that such costs were not exceptional costs which in the interest of 
justice should be awarded against the Defendants. 
As the prevailing party, Plaintiffs may be entitled to an award of attorney fees if 
authorized by statute or contract. A claim for attorney fees is to be deemed as costs and 
processed in the same manner. IRCP Rule 54( e )(5). As to the application of I.C. § 12-120(3), the 
gravamen of this action was based on a contract and commercial transaction. 
Idaho Code section 12-120( 3) compels an award of attorney fees to the 
prevailing party in an action to recover on a commercial transaction. I.C. § 12-
120(3): BECO Constr. Co., Inc. v . .f-U-B Eng'rs, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 726, 184 
P.3d 844, 851 (2008). A court must award attorney fees to the prevailing party in 
an action to recover on a "commercial transaction." I.C. § 12-120(3); BECO, 145 
Idaho at 726, 184 P .3d at 851. A "commercial transaction" is defined as "all 
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." I.C. § 12-
120(3). The test to determine whether this section applies is whether the 
commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit; it must be integral 
to the claim and constitute the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover. 
.Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423,432, 196 P.3d 341,350 (2008). 
Troupis v. Summer, 148 Idaho 77, 81,218 P.3d 1138, 1142 (2009). 
Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees under § 12-120(3). 
Plaintiff has also identified il 26 of the Lease Agreement as a basis for an award of 
attorney fees. That paragraph provides that the prevailing party in a dispute arising from the 
Lease is entitled to an award of attorney fees. Again, as to claims arising out of the subject 
Lease, the Court has found Plaintiff to be the overall prevailing party. 
This Court has reviewed the record and Plaintiff's motion and affidavit filed in supp01i of 
the claim for attorney fees. The Court has considered the respective claims made in this matter, 
the nature and progress of the litigation, and the ultimate outcome. Again, while Plaintiff was the 
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overall prevailing party, the Court found against Plaintiff on some issues and did not award all 
damages requested. The Court has further considered the factors set out in Rule 54( e )(3 ), 
I.R.C.P., including but not limited to the time required, the novelty and difficulty of the case, 
prevailing rates for attorney fees, and duplication of effort. Of the fees claimed, there will also be 
some discount based on billings not directly related to this action. Again, a discount of the 
amount of attorney fees claimed is appropriate in view those issues wherein the Court found 
against Plaintiff. 
This Court finds based upon the record that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney 
fees in the amount of $22,128. 
B. Prejudgment Interest 
The Court previously awarded prejudgment interest on the portion of the Judgment 
relating to unpaid rent on the premises. Plaintiff now seeks an order from the Court awarding 
prejudgment interest on the following damages awarded in the Judgment: (1) late fees: (2) 
upstairs storage rent; (3) pipeyard storage rent; (4) space #16 rent; and (5) food and drink credit. 
The law applicable to an award of prejudgment interest was set out in Ross v. Ross, 145 Idaho 
274, 276-277, 178 P.3d 639. 641-642 (App. 2007): 
Idaho statutory law. Idaho Code § 28-22-104, calls for the award of 
prejudgment interest on certain types of money claims, and case law likewise 
calls for prejudgment interest on damages awarded for unjust enrichment. Jones v. 
Whiteley, 112 Idaho 886, 889, 736 P.2d 1340. 1343 (Ct. App. 1987). Under either 
the statute or the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment, however, prejudgment 
interest is allowed only where the damages are liquidated or readily ascertainable 
by mathematical process. Id.; Child v. Blaser, 111 Idaho 702, 706, 727 P.2d 893. 
897 (Ct. App. 1986). This limitation is based upon "equitable considerations." 
Farm Dev. Corp. v. Hernandez, 93 Idaho 918, 920, 478 P.2d 298, 300 (1970), 
which presumably include the notion that a person who could not determine the 
amount owed should not be charged interest on the sum that is ultimately found to 
be due. See 22 AM.JUR.2D Damages § 654 (1988). However, "where the amount 
of liability is liquidated or capable of ascertainment by mere mathematical 
processes" interest is allowed from a time prior to judgment, "for in that event the 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 4 
268 
interest in fully compensating the injured party predominates over other equitable 
considerations:' Farm Dev. Corp., 93 Idaho at 920, 478 P.2d at 300 (quoting 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Clover Creek Cattle Co., 92 Idaho 889, 
900, 452 P.2d 993, 1004 (1969)). See also Doolittle v. Meridian Joint Sch Dist. 
No. 2. 128 [daho 805,814,919 P.2d 334,343 (1996); Davis v. Prof'! Bus. Serv .. 
Inc., 109 Idaho 810,817,712 P.2d 511. 518 (1985); Child, 111 Idaho at 706-07, 
727 P.2d at 897-98. 
The mere fact that a claim is disputed or litigated does not render damages 
"unascertainable," for if this were the case, a party could delay payment without 
incurring interest expense by disputing and litigating any claim, and prejudgment 
interest would never be awarded. Ace Realty, Inc. v. Anderson, 106 Idaho 742. 
751,682 P.2d 1289, 1298 (Ct. App. 1984). See also l'vfitchell v. Flandro, 95 Idaho 
228, 235, 506 P.2d 455, 462 (1972). Rather, damages are unascertainable where 
some factor necessary to calculaLe the amount of damages must be determined by 
a trier of fact. Conversely: 
A claim is liquidated if the evidence furnishes data which, if believed, 
makes it possible to compute the amount with exactness, without reliance 
upon opinion or discretion. Examples are claims upon promises to pay a 
fixed sum, claims for money had and received, claims for money paid out, 
and claims for goods or services to be paid for at an agreed rate. 
Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon Corp., 125 Idaho 744, 750 n. 2, 874 P.2d 555, 
561 n. 2 (Ct. App. 1993), qff'd, 125 Idaho 409, 871 P.2d 826 (1994). There need 
be no prayer for interest contained in the complaint to justify the award of 
prejudgment interest. Farm Dev. Corp., 93 [daho at 920, 478 P.2d at 300; Stueve 
v. Northern Lights, Inc., 122 Idaho 720,723,838 P.2d 323,326 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Based on the foregoing standard, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment 
interest on damages awarded for late fees, upstairs storage space, and the food and drink credit. 
Such damages were at all relevant times asce1iainable by mathematical process. However, the 
Court finds that damages related to the unjust enrichment claims of Space 16 and storage of the 
cooler were not mathematically asce1iainable. Those damages included two important variables 
namely. the amount of the unjust enrichment and when such damages accrued. These factors 
were not determined until the Comi, as the finder of fact, entered its decision. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest as follows: $931.30 in interest 
on damages for late fees, $1,241.38 in interest on damages for unpaid rent on the upstairs 
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storage, and $286.44 interest on damages for unpaid food and drink credit. The total amount of 
prejudgment interest as of March 23, 2010 is $2,459.12. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
The Court finds that Plaintiff is the prevailing Party and Plaintiff's motion for costs and 
attorney fees is granted. Defendants' motion for costs and fees is denied. Costs are awarded to 
Plaintiff in the amount of $1,178.53. Attorney fees are awarded to Plaintiff in the amount of 
$22,128. 
Plaintiff's motion for prejudgment interest is granted in part and denied in part, consistent 
v\·ith this decision. Prejudgment interest shall be awarded to Plaintiff in the amount of $2,459.12. 
DATED this ,s)_ / day of April, 2010. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ~/ day of April, 2010, I did send a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct postage 
thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective coutihouse mailbox; or by causing 
the same to be hand-delivered. 
Bryan D. Smith 
B .J. Drisco 11 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Michael J. Whyte 
THOMSEN STEPHENS 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
ROKALD LONG,\,,fQRE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Boru1eville County, Idaho 
By ~11J)/ 
Deputy Jerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAIIO, IN AND FOR THE COUJ\lTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff. 
V. 
MICHAEL STORMS and KATHY 
BURGGRAF. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-7258 
AMENDED JUDG !VIENT 
'l 
) 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs motion for costs and attorney fees 
and prejudgment interest. and the Court having entered its Order granting said motions, 
and good cause appearing therefore: 
IT JS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff have Judgment 
against Defendants in the amount of $43,096.25, plus prejudgment interest in the amount 
of $2,459.12, for a judgment of $45,555.37, with interest accruing at the statutory rate 
from March 23, 2010. 
IT JS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff have Judgment 
against Defendants for costs in the amount of $1,178.53 and attorney fees in the amount 
of $22,128 for a total of $23,306.53. Based on the foregoing, the total amount of 
AMENDED.JUDGMENT 
T 
Judgment against Defendants 1s $68,861.90. with interest accrumg thereon at the 
statutory rate. 
Dated this d ( day of April, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this J.J~ day of April, 2010, I did send a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; 
or by causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
B.J. Driscoll 
SMITH DRISCOLL & 
ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Michael J. Whyte 
THOMSEN STEPHENS 
LAW OFFICES. PLLC 
2635 Channing \Vay 
Idaho Falls. ID 83404 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 




Michael J. Whyte, Esq., ISB #4645 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
2635 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls ID 83404 
Telephone (208)522-1230 
Fax (208)522-1277 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
V. 














Case No. CV-08-7258 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS, THEW ATKINS COMPANY, 
LLC AND THE PARTIES ATTORNEYS, BRIAND. SMITH, ESQ AND B.J. DRISCOLL, 
ESQ, 414 SHOUP A VENUE, IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405 AND THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellants Michael Stonns and Kathy Burggraff, appeal against the 
above named defendants/respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment entered in the 
apove entitled action on the 23 rd day of March, 2010, Honorable Judge Joel E. Tingey presiding . 
. /:I 
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2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme 'court, and the judgments 
or orders described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 1 l(a)(l). 
3. Preliminary statement of the issues on appeal: 
(a) Whether the findings of fact of the district court are contrary to the weight of 
the evidence; 
(b) Whether the district court correctly concluded that defendants/appellants are 
in breach of the lease; 
( c) Whether the Court correctly determined that plaintiff/respondent in entitled 
to terminate the lease, evict defendant and regain possession of the property. 
( d) Whether the Court correctly determined the trial was to be heard by the Court 
instead of a jury as originally requested in the pleadings by the plaintiff and 
defendant. 
(e) Whether the parties had reached a compromise and/or an accord and 
satisfaction with respect to amounts claimed owing by appellants 
4. No portion of the record has been sealed. 
5. (a) 
(b) 
Is a repo1ier's transcript requested? Yes 
Appellate requests the reporter's standard transcript as defined in Rule 25( c) 
I.A.R. 
6. The appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's record 
in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: None. 
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7. The appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: All exhibits admitted as evidence 
during the trial. 
8. I certify that: 
(a) A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of whom 
a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Jack Fuller, 605 N. Capital Ave., Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
(b) That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the 
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
( c) That the estimated fees for preparation of the clerk's record have been paid. 
( d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
DATED this Jo day of April, 2010. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, P.L.L.C. 
By: 
3 - NOTICE OF APPEAL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and with 
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the~ day of April, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served upon the following persons at the addresses 
below their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct 
postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below. 
BRYAND SMITH ESQ 
B J DRISCOLL ESQ 
PO BOX 50731 
IDAHO FALLS ID 83405-0731 
JACK L. FULLER, CSR 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
605 N. CAPITAL A VENUE 
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83401 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
JDH:tlh 
J ldata\MJ\V\6753-003\00 I Ntc of Appeal.wpd 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -- ISB #44 l 1 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
bds(iil,eidaholaw.com 
bjd(cz)eidaho law. com 
Attorneys for PlaintiffJRespondent/Cross-Appellant 
BOHNE. L LC COUtiTY 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, 
an ldaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MICHAEL STORMS and KATHY 
BURGGRAF, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-08-7258 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL 
TO: MICHAEL STORMS, and KATHY BURGGRAF, Defendants/Respondents, 
and MICHAEL J. WHYTE, ESQ., of THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW 
OFFICES, PLLC, their attorneys of record; and TO THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT; 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
l. The above-named plaintif±Jrespondent/cross-appellant, The Watkins 
Company, LLC ("Watkins"), cross-appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Seventh 
Judicial District Court's Judgment entered March 23, 2010 and the Amended Judgment 
entered April 21, 20 l 0, in the above-entitled action against defendants/appellants/cross-
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respondents and in favor of Watkins, the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, 
presiding. 
2. Watkins has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgment described in paragraph one above is subject to appeal pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rules l l(a) and 15. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issue which Watkins intends to asse11 011 
cross-appeal is the following: 
a. Did the district court commit reversible error by refusing to 
enforce the remedies provision of the lease where the defendants failed to put 011 
any evidence of the future rental amount that Watkins could have reasonably 
avoided? 
4. The defendants/appellants/cross-respondents have already requested a 
copy of the reporter's standard transcript. Watkins does not request any additional 
reporter's transcripts. Watkins requests a copy or the transcript in electronic format. 
5. 
6. Watkins does not request any additional documents be included in the 
clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
7. Watkins does not request any additional exhibits, offered or admitted, 
other than those automatically included pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 28 and those 
designated by the appellants. 
8. 1 certify: 
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - Page 2 
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(a) That a copy of this notice of cross-appeal has been served on each 
reporter of whom a transcript has been requested, if any; 
(b) That the reporter who reported the trial before the district court and 
from whom a transcript has been requested has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcripts, if any; 
( c) That the estimated fee for including additional documents in the 
clerk's record has been paid, if any; 
( d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
( e) That service has been made upon all paities required to be served 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
DATED this __j_ day of May, 2010. 




At rneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this}/_ day of May, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL to be served, by placing 
the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the 
following: 
Michael J. Whyte, Esq. 
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, 
PLLC 
263 5 Channing Way 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Ronald Longmore 
Clerk ofthe District Court 
605 N. Capital Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, 83402 
[ ~·S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[~U.S. Mail 
[ ] rax 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, 

























Case No. CV-2008-725 8 
Docket No. 31/;, g3 
Appeal from: Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County 
Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding. 
Case number from Court: CV-2008-7258 
Order or Judgment appealed from: Judgment, entered March 23,2010 and the amended Judgment 
entered, April 21, 201 0. 
Attorney for Appellant/Respondent: 
Attorney for Respondent/ Appellants: 
Appealed by: 
Appealed against: 
Cross Appeal by: 
Cross Appeal against: 
Notice of Appeal Filed: 
Notice of Cross Appeal Filed: 
Appellate Fee Paid: 
Was District Court Rep01ier's Transcript requested? 
If so, name of reporter: 
Dated: May 10, 2010 
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Michael Whyte 
BJ. Driscoll 
Mike Stonns and Kathy Burggraf 
The Watkins Company 
The Watkins Company 
Michael Stmms and Kathy Burggraph 
April 30, 2010 
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limited liability company, ) 
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ORDER COKDITIONALL Y 
DISMISSING APPEAL 
Supreme Comi Docket No. 37685-2010 
Bo1meYille County Docket No. 
2008- 7258 
The Appellant having failed to pay the necessary fees for preparation of the Clerk's 
Record and Repo1ier's Transcript on appeal as required by Appellate Rule 27(c); therefore, good 
cause appeanng; 
lT HEREBY IS ORDERED that this appeal be, and hereby is, CONDlTIONi\LLY 
DISMISSED unless the required fees for preparation of the Clerk's Record and Reporter's 
Transcript are paid to the District Com1 Clerk within twenty-one (21) days from the date of this 
Order. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that this appeal is SUSPENTIED until further notice. 
DATED this J':?r: day of May 2010. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Com1 Clerk 
District Cami Repmier 
For the Supreme Cami 
"·R· .~ ./ ,,, .. u -:r. 
i I 
I ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING APPEAL~- Docket No. 37685-2010 
9111{:: ================='~========================='========='='=================================================~===========~======='~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, 























STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
County of Bonneville ) 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATION 
OF EXHIBITS 
Case No. CV-2008-7258 
Docket No. 
I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the foregoing Exhibits were marked for 
identification and offered in evidence, admitted, and used and considered by the Court in its 
determination: Please see attached pages. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit List Index, dated 2-9-10 
And I further certify that all of said Exhibits are on file in my office and are part of this record on 
Appeal in this cause, and are hereby transmitted to the Supreme Court. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the District Court 
this 1 ih day of June, 2010. 
RONALD LONGMORE 



















PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT LIST INDEX 
Watkins v. Storms, et al. 
Bonneville County Case No. CV-08-77258 
Trial Date: 02/09/2010 
Description Offer Admit Object 
Commercial Lease and Deposit 
Receipt dated 7/31/1996 with 
v v ,;yS-Addendum A, Addendum B, Exhibit N,}J 
C, and Addendum D 
The Watkins Company, LLC 
documents 
Documents re: Brownstone monthly \/ ti J:., / -1· / 
gross sales and sales tax payments .11M 
"Brownstone Monthly Rent Deposit" I ')'W 1,Jl-/ V >;/ forms 
Intentionally omitted 
Intentionally omitted 
Invoice 2005-105 dated 1/21/2005 
from Briggs Roofing to Walkins 
Enterprises for $2,680.00 
Ck #3934 dated 3/15/2005 from 
/ 
/ i~ Brownstone Companies, Inc. to V ·-1,0 
Watkins Enterprises for $1,780.00 
Ck #2051 stub dated 5/18/2005 from 
The Watkins Company to Briggs 
Roofing for $2,330.00 
Ck #4146 dated 12/23/2005 from ~v 
Brownstone Companies, Inc. to -~ v -,rv{i 
Watkins Enterprise for $5,000.00 
Invoice #2006-226 dated 5/2/2006 
from Briggs Roofing to V-./ atkins 
Enterprises for $12,135.00 
Intentionally omitted 
Invoice 120 from Briggs Roofing 
Company to Watkins Enterprise 
Ck #1225 dated 6/21/2007 from 
Brownstone Companies, Inc. to Dane 
Watkins for $500.00 
,/ / ~~/ 
Ck #4187 dated 6/22/2007 from The 
Watkins Company, LLC to Briggs v/ ~/ --11)J,1't£/ 
Roofing Company for $5,500.00 
Ck #4621 dated 12/4/2007 from The v' .. p-rJl--' Watkins Company, LLC to Waters v/ 
Construction for $4,000.00 
286 
Refuse Comment 
i • Intentionally omitted ! I 
18. Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or 
·./ ~ Quit the Premises dated 7/10/2008 V ~ 
]9. Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or / t/ ~ Quit the Premises dated 9/12/2008 .#1 i 
20. · "Brownstone Rent Deducted Due'' V i./ l"11-01'lv1 
21. Ck #1542 dated 7/J 1/2008 from 
"~ / AA Q Brownstone Companies, Inc. to 1 f -
Watkins & Watkins for $17,900.00 




Brownstone Companies, Inc. to v it/ 
Watkins Enterprises for $6,219.00 
I 23. Intentionally omitted 
1/8/2007 letter from Dane Watkins to I rrr Marvin Smith I 
5/5/2008 letter from Dane Watkins to 
V v ~,t,JZ_../ Mike Storms 
26. 6/12/2008 letters from Bryan D. v / ~ Smith to Brad Williams and Kathy l/r.fl 
Burggraf 
9/23/2008 letter from Michael J. 
Whyte to Bryan D. Smith 
28. 4/30/2009 letter from B. J. Driscoll 
to Michael J. Whyte 
• • 
4/13/2009 letter from B. J. Driscoll 
to Michael J. Whyte 
30. Photos of upstairs storage area I / \;/ ffvt,--r\Jlj 
31. Photos of Space #16 V \( '-·)1,v'VlQ_f 
32 Photos of sidewalk area V v nnn.P J 
Photos of "pipeyard" storage area \/ v "lUr '11 .V / 
34. Rent, Late Fees, And Interest 
1 l ks1-Summary 
35 Unjust Enrichment Summary 'i llltl;11 
36. Intentionally mnitted I 
j 
Total Damage Summary ·i I\ tt,t, 
38. Expired gifts certificates from 
Brownstone 
39. Defendants· Answers to Plaintiffs 
First Set of Interrogatories dated 
7/7/2009 
40. Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs 
First Set of Requests for Production 
dated 7/7/2009 
41. Defendants' Supplemental 
Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Requests for Production dated 
287 
8/11/2009 
42. Defendants' Supplemental Answers 
to Plaintiffs First Set of 
Interrogatories dated 10/27/2009 
43. Defendants' Second Supplemental 
Responses to Plaintiff's First set of 
I Interrogatories and Requests for 
I Production dated 11/12/2009 
44. Affidavit of Michael Storms dated 
12/10/2009 
45. Affidavit of Michael Storms dated 
7/28/2009 
46. Affidavit of Michael Storms in 
Support of his Objection to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment dated 
I 
12/23/2009 
47. Affidavit of Kathy Burggraf dated 
7/29/2009 
' 
F:\CLIENTS\E DS\7973\Trial\Exhibits\P.s Exhibi1 Index.doc 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, 

























Case No. CV-2008-7258 
Docket No. 37685 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 17 /~ay of June, 2010, I served a copy of the Reporter's 
Transcript (if requested) and the Clerk's Record in the Appeal to the Supreme Court in the above entitled 
cause upon the following attorneys: 
Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq. 
COX, OHMAN & BRANDSTETTER 
P.O. Box 51600 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1600 
Attorney for Appellant 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. 
McGRATH, MEACHAM & SMITH PLLC 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0731 
Attorney for Respondent 
by depositing a copy of each thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope addressed 
to said attorneys at the foregoing address, which is the last address of said attorneys known to me. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - I 
~ ;) {"t 
;:., ~- .. I 
